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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The issue of appropriate mechanisms for mobilising health care financing resources  
is once again high on the policy agenda of African governments.  The objectives of 
this paper, commissioned by EQUINET, are to critically evaluate how health services 
are currently funded, explore recent trends in health care financing and identify 
lessons from the health care financing experience of African countries.  It also 
considers the implications of this review for policy, advocacy and future research 
needs. 
 
Current health care financing 
At present, the key health care financing patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa are as 
follows: 
¾ The current level of health care funding from government tax revenue is relatively 
low in most African countries, particularly in relation to the target of 15% of total 
government expenditure being devoted to the health sectors agreed to by the 
African Heads of State in Abuja in 2001.  In the majority of countries (about 60%), 
the health sector share of total government expenditure is below 10%.  Achieving 
the 15% target would reflect government commitment to some degree of health 
sector prioritisation in expenditure. It does not imply that this level of funding 
would be adequate to meet national health needs, even at a most basic level. 
¾ There is still a reasonably high level of reliance on donor funding in African 
countries.  Donor funding accounts for over a quarter of total health care funding 
in about 35% of countries, with 5% of countries having more than half of all health 
care funding coming from external sources. 
¾ There is limited insurance coverage in African countries, especially in relation to 
mandatory health insurance.  However, community pre-payment schemes have 
been on the increase in recent years. 
¾ One of the single largest sources of financing is that of out-of-pocket payments, 
which exceed 25% of total health care expenditure in more than three-quarters of 
sub-Saharan African countries.  Out-of-pocket payments include user fees at 
public sector facilities as well as direct payments to private providers, both non-
profit providers (e.g. missions) and for-profit providers (ranging from doctors 
working in private practice to informal drug sellers and traditional healers). 
 
Recent health care financing developments 
There have been a number of important developments in health care financing in 
African countries in recent years, as summarised below for each financing 
mechanism. 
 
Tax funding 
The availability of adequate tax funding is critical if problems in equitably accessing 
health care are to be addressed.  While it is difficult to increase tax revenue in African 
countries due to the limited tax base and that it is often not feasible or advisable to 
increase personal income tax rates any further, improved tax collection systems have 
contributed to dramatic increases in tax revenue in some cases and the potential for 
increased corporate taxes should be seriously explored.  In addition, another 
EQUINET report highlights that there are a range of wealth taxes (e.g. taxes on 
financial transactions flows, luxury airline travel, currency exchanges) that should be 
considered. There has been growing advocacy for an increased share of government 
budgets for the health sector.  One of the main constraints to achieving the Abuja 
target is the high level of external debt experienced in many countries that translates 
into interest payments and debt repayments consuming a considerable share of 
government budgets.  Debt relief efforts under the HIPC initiative have, in many 
instances, been wholly inadequate.  The recent G8 ‘debt cancellation’ initiative may 
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hold more promise in enabling governments to devote more of their limited tax 
funding to the provision of health and other social services (many of which also 
contribute to health status improvements).  However, this debt relief will be provided 
over a period of 40 years which will once again translate into relatively small annual 
reductions in the debt burden and there are also concerns about the conditionalities 
linked to this debt relief.  A wider range of more substantive efforts to reduce the debt 
burden on African governments is required. 
 
Donor funding 
The trend towards the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in donor funding has been 
largely positive in the African context.  It has contributed to improved coordination 
mechanisms for managing donor finances and promoted the use of donor funds in 
line with domestic policy priorities.  There are concerns about some donors’ recent 
move away from health sector pooled funding to general budget support (i.e. where 
all donor funds are given to Treasury and allocation between sectors is part of the 
normal budgeting process).  Part of the concern is whether the health sector will 
receive a ‘fair share’ of donor funds under this arrangement.  Another concern is that 
this could potentially undermine the role of the Ministry of Health in crucial areas of 
health policy, particularly in relation to health care financing.  Given that Ministries of 
Finance wield considerable power in many African governments and are frequently 
more responsive to donor demands than sectoral Ministries, it is possible that donors 
could attempt to impose their health sector priorities (especially their views on health 
care financing strategies) via applying pressure on Treasury officials who in turn 
could apply pressure on Ministry of Health officials. 
 
Out-of-pocket payments, especially user fees 
The key development in relation to user fees in recent years is the removal of fees for 
some or all health services in some African countries, such as South Africa and 
Uganda, and the mounting pressure on other African countries to adopt a similar 
policy.  The experience in countries that have removed fees was that there were 
rapid and large utilisation increases, especially for the poor. However, the experience 
of fee removal has not been entirely positive (e.g. declining staff morale due to 
increased workload and problems in the implementation process, and drug shortages 
as utilisation levels increased) and highlights the need for careful planning and 
adequate resource improvements before such a dramatic policy change is 
introduced.  With the introduction of ‘free care’ in Uganda, there were simultaneous 
substantial increases in district health service funding which mitigated some of the 
problems that arose in South Africa.  However, much of these additional resources 
came from external sources, and there are concerns about the sustainability of these 
levels of funding if external funds are withdrawn.  In essence, the experience to date 
demonstrates the need for detailed and adequate planning, careful and active 
management of the responses of health workers and managers, and improved 
resource availability (particularly domestic resources) if fees are removed to continue 
to provide adequate quality services in the face of increased utilisation. 
 
Health insurance 
In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis among international 
organisations on health insurance as a financing mechanism.  For example, the 2005 
World Health Assembly passed a resolution encouraging member states to pursue 
social and other forms of health insurance. 
 
As indicated previously, health insurance is still relatively limited within Africa. Private 
voluntary insurance schemes for formal sector workers are mainly concentrated in 
Southern Africa (particularly South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia) but also exist to a 
more limited extent in some East and West African countries.  Experience of these 
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types of schemes has not been entirely positive, with very limited coverage levels, 
fragmentation of risk pools and rapid, uncontrolled cost spirals threatening their 
sustainability.  For these reasons, justifiably limited attention is being paid to 
expanding this form of health insurance within the African context. 
 
Instead, the option of community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes 
(sometimes called community pre-payment schemes or mutual health organisations) 
is rapidly gaining favour.  As these schemes are funded by annual or more frequent 
contributions, but do not require payments at the time of using health services, they 
lower financial barriers to access.  There is also some degree of cross-subsidy, 
particularly from the healthy to the ill.  From these perspectives, CBHI is a preferable 
alternative to out-of-pocket payments.  However, there is still quite weak empirical 
evidence on what works and what doesn’t.  Experience to date shows that population 
coverage by these schemes has remained relatively low, and that the most 
vulnerable households are not currently incorporated. Thus, most of these schemes 
have small risk pools and limited cross-subsidies.  Given that there is an urgent need 
for more work to explore how the viability, sustainability and equity contribution of 
such schemes can be strengthened before they can be introduced on a wide scale, it 
is of concern that some international stakeholders are advocating these schemes as 
the new ‘one size fits all solution’ to the health care financing gap in African 
countries. 
 
Another option that is being considered or introduced in a growing number of African 
countries is that of mandatory health insurance (i.e. where legislation makes it 
compulsory for all or some citizens to become members of a health insurance).  
Tanzania recently introduced a social health insurance (SHI) covering civil servants, 
which is now being extended to formal sector workers in the private sector.  South 
Africa is also putting in place the key elements that will underpin a future SHI, and 
will also begin with mandatory insurance for civil servants. The major potential benefit 
of introducing a SHI is that it would relieve the burden on publicly-funded health 
services; SHI members would either use private sector services or where they do use 
public services, the SHI would reimburse the full cost of these services. However, 
there are two important concerns with the SHI approach.  Firstly, it entrenches a two 
tier health system, creating a deep divide between the insured, who have excellent 
access to a wide range of high quality health services, and the uninsured who often 
are consigned to under-resourced public sector services for the poor.  Secondly, the 
first group to be covered by mandatory health insurance are civil servants and limited 
government funds will be used for this purpose and there may be fewer government 
resources available for providing services for those who are dependent on publicly-
funded services. 
 
Some African countries, such as Ghana, are seeking to combine SHI for formal 
sector workers with district-wide CBHI schemes in order to implement a universal 
national health insurance (NHI) system (Kenya is proposing a similar approach, but 
these plans are currently ‘on hold’).  The contributions of low income households will 
be partly or fully subsidised out of tax and pooled donor funds, and there will be risk-
equalisation between the individual district schemes and the scheme for formal 
sector workers.  For countries that have opted for NHI from an early stage, there are 
certain benefits but also considerable challenges.  The major benefit from an equity 
perspective is that there is the political intention to achieve universal coverage in an 
integrated health system from the outset in the shortest possible period.  However, a 
key challenge is that of sustainability.  Considerable administrative, financial 
management and actuarial capacity is needed in order for the NHI to succeed.  In 
addition, in the context of a small formal sector, with those outside the formal sector 
only able to make limited financial contributions, and high poverty levels, there are 
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serious concerns about the financial viability and sustainability of the NHI scheme.  
Clearly substantial government (and donor) funding is needed, but there is 
uncertainty about whether these resources will be adequate to cope with the 
increased utilisation of health services that will inevitably arise when financial barriers 
to accessing services are removed. 
 
Implications for policy, advocacy and research 
On the basis of this review, the following actions are recommended in relation to 
health care financing within the African context: 
¾ Explicit commitments by African governments to move away from out-of-pocket 
funding of public sector health services, and actively pursuing alternative financing 
mechanisms to make this a reality. 
¾ Efforts to increase tax revenue through improved tax collection mechanisms and 
more appropriate corporate and wealth taxation strategies. 
¾ Urgent efforts to increase the health sector’s share of government resources in 
line with the existing commitment of African Heads of States, made in Abuja in 
2001, to a 15% share for health. 
¾ Unconditional cancellation of African governments’ external debt, to allow 
governments to devote limited tax revenue to health care to achieve the Abuja 
goal, rather than to debt servicing and repayment. 
¾ As general tax funding and health insurance options are most closely aligned with 
the above principles, introducing or expanding insurance mechanisms to 
supplement limited tax resources should receive considerable attention, including 
detailed research of context-specific insurance options, monitoring and evaluation 
of insurance initiatives currently being implemented in some countries, sharing of 
experiences across the region and increased policy dialogue about these options. 
¾ Active management of donor funding, to ensure that national Ministries of Health 
lead and control decisions on the use of these funds to ensure that they contribute 
to achieving national health priorities. 
¾ Implementing effective mechanisms for identifying the poor and other vulnerable 
groups.  Even if there is a move away from user fees for public sector services in 
favour of health insurance mechanisms to supplement tax funding, it will be 
necessary to protect poor and other vulnerable households by either fully or 
partially subsidising membership of these schemes or ensuring appropriate 
access to tax funded health services. 
¾ Equitable allocation of funds that are mobilised through the above strategies, to 
ensure that all citizens of African countries have access to health services 
irrespective of whether they reside in a rural or urban area. 
¾ Careful planning for the implementation of any of new financing policy 
developments. The range of strategies that can support implementation include 
ensuring that the views of beneficiaries are taken into consideration when 
designing new policies, gaining support from the health staff responsible for 
implementation, and ensuring monitoring and evaluation systems that do not 
simply measure progress towards targets, but rather represent ‘early learning’ 
mechanisms that allow the process, as much as the design, of interventions to be 
adapted as implementation proceeds. 
 
These actions need to be supported by detailed research, dissemination of evidence, 
exchange of information on promising practice and policy dialogue to provide and 
use a good evidence base to promote the design and implementation of equitable 
health care financing systems.  EQUINET plans to initiate a program of research, 
information dissemination, policy dialogue and support of policy processes to 
contribute to the development and uptake of this evidence base. 
 1
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper has been commissioned by the Regional Network for Equity in Health in 
east and southern Africa (EQUINET) to inform the development of a new program of 
work on equitable financing.  In recent years, EQUINET has focused much of its 
health care financing work on the issue of resource allocation.  The new program of 
work will focus primarily on resource mobilisation issues. Hence, this paper provides 
a critical assessment of the state of knowledge on the mobilisation of health care 
resources in the African context as a starting point for the new program.  It focuses 
primarily on domestic health care financing options. Although it briefly refers to issues 
related to external debt issues and donor funding, it does not consider wider 
macroeconomic policy issues associated with interaction with international 
institutions nor on options to reverse the flow of resources out of Africa.  While we 
recognise that this would increase the level of domestic resources available for 
health care, these issues are addressed in another EQUINET paper (Bond, 2005). 
 
There are a number of reasons why it is important to focus on the issue of resource 
mobilisation in Africa at this point in time.  Firstly, the lack of financial resources in 
African countries to adequately meet the health service needs of their populations 
remains a persistent problem, and is becoming even more critical in the context of 
the rapid growth of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and factors such as the need to introduce 
more expensive combination therapy for malaria due to widespread resistance to 
chloroquine and other relatively inexpensive monotherapies. Secondly, there is 
growing evidence of the adverse impact of some of the health care financing reforms 
introduced in Africa during the late 1980s and 1990s, particularly in relation to the 
untenable burden placed on individual households, which in some cases contributes 
to household impoverishment.  There is thus an urgent need to identify ways of 
reversing the damaging financing reforms of previous decades.  Thirdly, new health 
care financing approaches are being proposed, and in some countries already being 
introduced, making this an opportune time to critically assess these approaches.  Of 
particular importance in this regard are: the renewed interest in removing user fees 
from some or all health services, which has already been taken forward in a few 
countries such as South Africa, Uganda and to some extent in Kenya and which is 
the subject of growing advocacy initiatives; increasing emphasis on health insurance 
mechanisms, with efforts to expand insurance coverage being introduced in a 
number of African countries and a resolution at the 2005 World Health Assembly 
encouraging even greater pursuit of insurance strategies; and the move by some 
donors to provide general budget support (i.e. channelling all donor funds via the 
Ministry of Finance) rather than direct funding to the health sector.  While some of 
these approaches may be beneficial, others may not and it is important for individual 
countries and regional groupings to be fully informed of the likely impacts of each 
initiative so as to avoid the historical tendency for reforms to be imposed on African 
countries by international organisations rather than being locally developed and 
driven.  Fourth, the context within which health care financing decisions are made 
has changed.  A key issue is the debt relief initiatives of the last few years, and very 
recently the cancellation of debt for some countries, which provides a real opportunity 
to consider alternatives such as increased tax funding of health services which has 
not been a realistic option over the past decade or so.  A related issue is current 
international debates (e.g. in the High Level Forum) about the level of ‘fiscal space’ 
that countries have, i.e. the scope for increased government expenditure on key 
social services and advocacy for changes in macroeconomic policies and global 
trade relations that may create more fiscal space.  Finally, there is a need to 
recognise that policy developments in health care delivery, such as continued 
commercialisation of health services, have profound implications for health care 
financing strategies. 
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For the above reasons, it is necessary to critically evaluate how health services are 
currently funded, explore recent trends in health care financing and identify lessons 
from the health care financing experience of African countries.  Although EQUINET 
focuses mainly on Southern and East Africa in its activities, there are important 
lessons to be learnt from West African countries and thus, this paper reviews 
relevant experience throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  In addition, it is important 
to consider the way forward and particularly key issues in considering future options 
for packages of financing mechanisms, rather than focusing simply on the pros and 
cons of individual financing options as has been done in the past.  Not only is it 
important to recognise that no country uses a single mechanism to finance their 
health services, but it is essential to begin to take a more comprehensive view of 
health care financing in order to see the inter-relationships between different 
financing mechanisms and the way in which they either contribute to or work against 
overall health system equity.  While future options will be reviewed, the emphasis will 
be on developing a set of equity-focused principles that can be used to guide detailed 
evaluation of options for financing packages within individual country contexts, given 
that ‘one size does not fit all’. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: 
• The next section defines key concepts in terms of health care financing equity, 
and provides a brief overview of international empirical evidence on the relative 
equity of the main health care financing mechanisms; 
• Section 3 reviews how health services are currently financed in SSA countries; 
• Section 4 provides a detailed review of recent experience of alternative health 
care financing mechanisms in SSA countries, with individual sub-sections on 
each of the major financing mechanisms and a final section highlighting key 
issues in relation to overall health care financing patterns; 
• The final section considers the implications of this review in terms of policy 
directions and areas for future advocacy and research. 
 
 
2. Equitable health care financing: key concepts 
Before examining current patterns and recent trends in health care financing in 
African countries, it is important to provide broad definitions of the concept of 
equitable financing and to briefly explore international empirical evidence on the 
equity of different financing mechanisms.  This provides a background against which 
to assess experience with individual financing mechanisms in Africa.  The final 
section of this paper considers in more detail what principles should underpin future 
health care financing developments in the African context. 
 
There is consensus that equity in health care financing should be related to an 
individual’s ability to pay. More specifically, it is accepted that individuals (or families) 
with different ability to pay should make ‘appropriately dissimilar payments’ for health 
care with higher income individuals paying more than those with a lower income level 
(referred to as vertical equity).  At the same time, it would also be equitable for 
individuals (or families) with the same ability to pay to contribute the same amount 
towards their health care costs (referred to as horizontal equity) (Wagstaff and 
Doorslaer, 1993).  However, there is less agreement on what is meant by 
‘appropriately dissimilar payments’.  Those with greater ability to pay may pay a 
higher percentage of their income than lower income groups (i.e. payments may be 
progressive), or they may simply pay more in absolute terms (i.e. payments may be 
proportional, where everyone contributes the same percentage of their income, or 
even regressive, where the poor pay a higher percentage of their income than the 
rich).  EQUINET has previously indicated that it supports the concept of vertical 
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equity, but as illustrated above, this simply means that the rich should pay more than 
the poor in relation to the burden of health care financing.  We would argue that, 
within the African context of high poverty levels and the inability of many households 
to afford even relatively small payments towards health care, combined with 
substantial inequities in the distribution of income across households, vertical equity 
in health care financing should be interpreted as a strong preference for progressive 
financing mechanisms. 
 
When considering the equity of health care financing, one can not simply consider 
who bears the burden of paying for health services; it is equally important to consider 
who derives the benefit from each source of finance.  In this paper, equity in service 
benefit is defined as individuals benefiting on the basis of their need for health 
services and not on their ability to pay.  Thus, it is the combination of the distribution 
of health care payment burdens relative to ability to pay, and the distribution of health 
service benefits relative to need, that determine the equity of individual health care 
financing mechanisms. 
 
A growing number of studies are being undertaken to evaluate the relative 
progressivity of different types of health care financing and the distribution of benefits 
according to need for health services.  Initially these focused mainly on high income 
countries (Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 1993, Wagstaff et al., 1999), but some 
evidence now exists for low- and middle-incomes, particularly in Asia (EQUITAP, 
2005).  These studies demonstrate that: 
¾ General tax revenue is usually the most progressive health care financing 
mechanism.  However, this depends on the type of taxes levied and the relative 
contribution of each tax to overall government revenue.  For example, personal 
income tax is generally progressive whereas ‘indirect’ taxes on goods and 
services (such as Value Added Tax – VAT, or General Sales Tax – GST) are 
frequently regressive.  If a high proportion of general tax revenue comes from VAT 
or GST, the overall tax system may be regressive.  It should be noted that recent 
evidence from Asia indicates that indirect taxes may not be regressive in some 
countries (EQUITAP, 2005), particularly where the informal sector is large and the 
major purchases of poor households are for fresh food produce that escapes the 
VAT or GST net.  On the benefit side, there is mixed evidence.  Funding of health 
services from general tax revenue can preferentially benefit those with the 
greatest need for health care, if it is appropriately allocated.  However, a number 
of studies on the distribution of benefits from publicly (tax) funded services in 
African countries have shown that the rich benefit most from these services 
(Castro-Leal, 1996, Castro-Leal et al., 1999, Demery et al., 1995).  This usually 
occurs when a major share of tax funding is allocated to large, expensive, urban-
based hospitals rather than to primary care services and services in rural areas. 
¾ Mandatory health insurance (i.e. where certain individuals and groups are 
required by law to contribute to a health insurance scheme) in many high-income 
countries is regressive.  This is dependent on how contribution rates are 
structured, particularly whether there is a flat rate contribution, which is highly 
regressive, or a contribution rate that increases with income.  In addition, the 
existence of a maximum ceiling rate, where no individual should pay more than 
this amount irrespective of their income, tends to make the insurance regressive.  
Recent evidence from Asia shows that mandatory insurance is usually progressive 
in these low- and middle-income countries.  However, this is largely attributable to 
the fact mandatory insurance in these countries only covers those in formal sector 
employment, who are the highest income individuals.  As noted in the Asian study, 
“One must be careful not to place a redistribution interpretation on these results. 
In partial social insurance systems, the better-off do not only pay more, they get 
more.  The poor do not contribute but they are also denied the benefits of 
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coverage” (EQUITAP, 2005).  This highlights that where mandatory health 
insurance covers only a section of the population, the distribution of the benefits 
from health services funded from this source may be distributed according to need 
within the insured population, but given that the uninsured frequently have even 
greater need for health services than the insured, the distribution of benefits in the 
overall health system is not enhanced through this financing mechanism. 
¾ Private voluntary insurance follows a similar pattern to that for mandatory 
insurance. In high-income countries which have a large private voluntary 
insurance component, it tends to be a regressive financing source.  In most of 
these countries, private insurance contributions are related to the risk of illness of 
the member (e.g. older and chronically ill members pay higher premiums than 
young, relatively healthy individuals) and this makes them more regressive than 
mandatory insurance systems (Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 1993).  In lower 
income countries, this financing mechanism is again likely to be progressive to 
some extent because only the higher income groups belong and contribute to 
such schemes.  Importantly, however, the benefits of these financial resources 
only accrue to these richer, contributing groups, as a result of ability to pay rather 
than need being the basis of benefit distribution.  Private insurance is, thus, 
inimical to equity in any context, except where it only offers a ‘top-up’ to a 
comprehensive basic package of services available to all on the basis of need. 
¾ Out-of-pocket payments are generally a regressive form of financing and tend to 
be the most regressive way of funding health services (Van Doorslaer and 
Wagstaff, 1993).  This is partly related to the fact that those with the lowest 
income levels tend to bear the greatest burden of ill-health and thus bear the 
greatest financing burden as payment is directly linked to use of health services.  
Out-of-pocket payments, in systems where a relatively large share of health care 
financing is attributable to this source, will always be regressive unless the 
majority of low-income people simply do not use health services when needed.  
From the perspective of health service benefits, out-of-pocket payments are also 
inimical to equity, as benefits are distributed solely on the basis of ability to pay 
rather than on the basis of need for health care. 
 
No country relies entirely on a single health care financing mechanism, but rather 
uses a combination of these mechanisms as an overall health care financing 
package.  The extent to which the overall health care financing package is equitable 
or not depends on the relative share and equity or inequity of each financing 
mechanism, both in terms of the distribution of the burden of health care payments 
(financing incidence) and the distribution of health service benefits (benefit 
incidence).  Appendix A provides a detailed and (hopefully) user-friendly overview of 
how the financing and benefit incidence of individual financing mechanisms influence 
overall health system equity. 
 
This brief introduction to health care financing equity issues provides a backdrop 
against which to review current health care financing patterns in Africa and recent 
financing policy developments. 
 
3. Overview of current health care financing in African countries 
A useful starting point for considering future health care financing options for African 
countries is to review current financing patterns.  Thus, this section provides a brief 
overview of the major sources of health care financing in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It is 
based on data for 2002 drawn from the World Health Organisation’s National Health 
Accounts (NHA) database (http://www.who.int/nha/country/whrannex/en).  While 
there are questions about the accuracy of NHA data in some African countries, this is 
the only reasonably comprehensive global database on health care financing and 
expenditure available and is adequate for illustrating key features of health care 
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financing and expenditure in Sub-Saharan African countries.  A key problem with the 
NHA dataset is that data on ‘government’ spending on health care includes that 
which is funded from national tax revenue and from donor sources, i.e. it is 
impossible to determine exactly how much funding government is contributing to 
health care from its domestic tax sources alone.  Despite these drawbacks in the 
available data, a number of key issues relating to health care financing in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) can be identified (see Appendix B for full data on health care 
spending in SSA countries). 
 
There is still a relatively heavy reliance on donor funding in some countries.  The 
figure below shows that external funding as a percentage of total health care 
expenditure is 10% or more in 55% of SSA countries.  Donor funds account for more 
than a quarter of health care expenditure in 31% of countries, and account for as 
much as 66% of expenditure in some countries (Benin).  It should be noted that these 
external funds do not only flow via government but may also go directly to the private 
sector (e.g. to mission hospitals). 
 
Figure 1: External funding as percentage of total health care expenditure 
(Percentage of SSA countries in each category) 
45%
24%
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25% +
 
Source: World Health Organisation NHA database (2002 estimates) 
 
There are very high levels of out-of-pocket payments in most African countries. Out-
of-pocket payments include user fees at public sector facilities as well as direct 
payments to private providers, ranging from doctors working in private practice to 
informal drug sellers and traditional healers.  Figure 2 indicates that these payments 
account for 25% or more of total health care expenditure in 78% of African countries. 
In 40% of SSA countries, more than half of all health care is expenditure is funded 
through out-of-pocket payments. 
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Figure 2: Out-of-pocket payments as percentage of total health care 
expenditure (Percentage of SSA countries in each category) 
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Source: World Health Organisation NHA database (2002 estimates) 
 
Levels of tax funding for health services are relatively low.  Only three African 
countries have close to or above 15% of total government expenditure being devoted 
to health care, namely Tanzania at 14.9%, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
at 16.4% and Mozambique at 19.9% in 2002.  However, the WHO NHA database 
includes donor funds channelled via the government in these estimates1.  As 27% of 
total health care expenditure in Tanzania, 28% in the DRC 39% in Mozambique is 
funded from donor or external sources, it is clear that government resources 
excluding donor funds do not exceed 15% in any of these countries.  The majority 
(60%) of Sub-Saharan African countries have levels of government health care 
expenditure of less than 10% of total government expenditure (including both local 
tax funding and external donor funding).  Most of the countries with health care 
expenditure levels above 10% of total government expenditure have relatively high 
levels of donor funding, with the exception of Burkina Faso, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
 
One interesting trend that is observable from the NHA data (see Figure 3) is that in 
countries where there is a commitment to devoting a relatively large share of 
government resources to the health sector, the burden of out-of-pocket payments is 
kept relatively low. Figure 3 orders countries in terms of the percentage share of total 
health care expenditure attributable to out-of-pocket payments, from lowest to 
highest.  This can be compared with the percentage share of government 
expenditure devoted to health which, as the trend line shows, declines on average as 
out-of-pocket expenditure levels increase.  While there is no clear pattern in terms of 
external funding, it is positively correlated with the health sector’s share of total 
government expenditure. 
 
                                                 
1 This is a very serious deficiency of the WHO NHA dataset.  The combination of donor 
funding with tax funding in this dataset makes it impossible to monitor progress towards the 
Abuja target. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of out-of-pocket, government and donor funding levels in Sub-Saharan African countries 
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Source: World Health Organisation NHA database (2002 estimates) 
 8
 
Another factor that influences the share of out-of-pocket payments in overall health 
care expenditure is the extent of health insurance (or pre-payment) schemes’ 
coverage in a particular country.  In general, health insurance is very limited in SSA.  
Private insurance of any magnitude is largely restricted to Southern Africa (including 
Botswana, Madagascar, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe; and Kenya in East 
Africa).  In these countries, the major type of insurance is private voluntary coverage 
of formal sector employees.  There has been a recent growth in community health 
insurance (pre-payment) schemes in some countries, particularly in Central and West 
Africa and more recently in East and to a limited extent Southern Africa, but this 
remains a very small component of overall health care financing at present.  Any 
sizeable pre-payment via social security funding is largely restricted to West Africa 
(Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Togo), and is non-existent in the vast 
majority of countries. 
 
In summary, the key health care financing patterns in SSA are: 
¾ The current level of health care funding from government tax revenue is relatively 
low; 
¾ There is still a reasonably high level of reliance on donor funding; 
¾ There is limited insurance coverage, especially in relation to mandatory health 
insurance; 
¾ One of the single largest sources of financing is that of out-of-pocket payments. 
 
 
4. Recent developments in health care financing in Africa 
 
4.1 Tax funding 
There has been almost no discussion of increasing tax funding for health services in 
African countries over the past few decades (until very recently); it was simply not 
seen as an option worth considering.  Many African countries were experiencing 
extremely limited economic growth, if at all, and when combined with the 
requirements to reduce government expenditure as part of Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) conditionalities, governments were extremely constrained in the 
allocation of tax funding towards health services. 
 
This situation has changed in recent years and increased tax funding for the health 
sector is now receiving attention. There are a number of factors that have contributed 
to this, including: 
¾ An emerging consensus that the health care financing reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s, such as user fees and other ‘cost recovery’ or ‘cost sharing’ initiatives, did 
not live up to the promise of generating substantial additional resources for health 
care and in some respects created a host of other problems.  In the face of a 
growing burden of illness associated with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the need to 
introduce more costly treatment strategies for priority diseases, such as 
artemisinin-based combination therapies for malaria due to drug resistance 
problems, there is an interest in seriously considering the potential for increased 
funding from tax revenue sources. 
¾ Recent empirical evidence shows that health systems in low- and middle-income 
countries that have a large and strong public sector, which is substantively funded 
through tax revenue, are most equitable (both in relation to progressive financing 
and access according to need).  This has been particularly highlighted in a large 
cross-country study in Asia which has shown that Hong Kong, which has a largely 
tax funded system, has one of the most progressive health care financing systems 
(EQUITAP, 2005). In addition, Hong Kong stands out as having the most strongly 
pro-poor distribution of health service benefits, followed by Malaysia, Thailand and 
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Sri Lanka, all of which have 50% or more of total health care expenditure funded 
from government revenue sources (EQUITAP, 2005) 
¾ The recognition of the importance of general tax funding as the cornerstone of 
effective health systems in the African Heads of State’s commitment to increase 
tax funding for health services. This was made as part of the “Abuja Declaration 
on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other related infectious diseases”, where it was 
recognised that “there is a need to secure adequate financial and human 
resources at national and international levels” in order to successfully address the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic.  The Heads of State pledged themselves to “a target of 
allocating at least 15% of our annual budget to the improvement of the health 
sector” (OAU, 2001).  
¾ Recent debt relief initiatives have raised the possibility that African governments 
may be able to devote less of their limited tax funding to paying interest and 
repaying external debt and direct more tax resources to health and other social 
services. 
 
Before considering in greater detail the extent to which these and related factors 
have (or haven’t) already contributed, or could potentially in future contribute, to 
increased tax funding of health services, it is useful to consider the key variables that 
determine the amount of government funding devoted to the health sector.  Hay 
provides a helpful ‘formula’ in this regard: 
Government expenditure on health services per capita =  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita x  
Share of GDP devoted to government expenditure x  
Share of government expenditure spent on health services (Hay, 2003) 
This ‘formula’ highlights the importance of the size of the economy and economic 
growth rates, policy decisions about the size of the government sector relative to the 
rest of the economy (which is influenced by the amount of tax revenue generated and 
the ability to secure loans and/or grants) and finally the prioritisation of the health 
sector relative to other sectors in government policy.   
 
Size of the economy and economic growth rates 
An indication of the size of the economy, or level of overall income, is provided for 
each SSA country in Appendix B, expressed in terms of GDP2 per capita. There are 
wide differences in this indicator between countries, ranging from US$99 per capita 
in Ethiopia, US$ 103 in the DRC and US$117 in Burundi to US$7,017 per capita in 
the Seychelles, US$4,097 in Gabon and US$3,690 Botswana. 
 
Overall, the average Gross National Income (GNI)3 per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is US$460, which is slightly higher than the average for all low income countries 
(US$390).  Average per capita GNI is nearly 3 times greater in lower-middle income 
countries (US$1,250) than in SSA, more than 8 times greater in upper-middle income 
countries (US$3,730) and 57 times greater in high income countries (US$26,150) 
(data from World Bank Development Indicators website). 
 
To state the obvious, African countries have extremely limited economic resources, 
constraining their ability to generate tax revenue and to fund health and other social 
services.  This is exacerbated by the relatively slow rate at which African economies 
have been growing, although this situation has improved in recent years.  Table 1 
                                                 
2 GDP is the total market value of all goods and services produced in a country in a given 
year. 
3 GNI not only includes the value of goods and services produced within a country (i.e. GDP) 
but also includes income from economic activities between this country and the rest of the 
world (e.g. interest earned by local residents on investments abroad) 
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shows that the annual GDP growth rate in real terms (i.e. removing the effects of 
inflation) has been higher in SSA countries than in ‘advanced economies’ in most 
years during the period 1995-2002.  It has also generally far exceeded that in 
‘countries in transition’, but has consistently been well below the average for all 
developing countries, largely because of the considerably faster growth rates in 
developing countries in Asia. 
 
Table 1: Annual growth in real GDP 
Category/Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Advanced economies 2.7 2.9 3.5 2.7 3.4 4.1 1.9 2.7
Countries in transition -1.5 -0.5 1.6 -0.9 2.6 5.8 4.0 4.2
Developing Asia 9.0 8.2 6.6 4.0 6.1 6.9 5.9 6.4
Africa 3.0 5.7 2.9 3.3 2.3 3.0 4.2 4.4
Developing countries 6.1 6.5 5.8 3.5 3.9 5.8 5.0 5.6
Source: World Economic Outlook indicators, World Bank website 
 
 
Share of GDP devoted to government expenditure 
In the late 1990s, total government expenditure accounted for about 24% of GDP in 
African countries on average, compared with an average of nearly 29% in middle-
income countries and an average of over 32% in high-income countries (Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health, 2002).  There are even wider differences if 
individual countries are considered, ranging from 11% in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and 12% in Cameroon to 47% in Kuwait and 48% in the Netherlands.  
This is partly attributable to macroeconomic policies adopted in many African 
countries which explicitly attempted to reduce the level of government expenditure.  
Frequently these policies were imposed on African governments by means of 
Structural Adjustment Programs associated with IMF and World Bank loans.  There 
is growing international debate about the need to reverse these macroeconomic 
policies in order to create the ‘fiscal space’ to improve government spending on 
social services. 
 
As indicated previously, another important factor influencing government spending as 
a proportion of total economic activity is the extent of tax revenue that is generated.  
While African countries tend to have a small tax base (i.e. a small amount of 
economic activity and small number of people in formal employment from which tax 
revenue can be secured), and there are concerns not to place too heavy a burden on 
the limited number of registered tax payers (and substantial opposition by these 
groups to any tax rate increases), there are ways in which tax revenue can be 
increased.  For example, tax revenue has grown considerably in recent years in 
South Africa, despite the fact that personal income tax rates have been reduced 
systematically over this period (National Treasury, 2005).  The main reason is that 
tax collection has been improved through more careful assessment of income tax 
returns and imposing heavy penalties on those who defraud the tax authorities.  
Another way in which tax revenue could be increased is through appropriate 
corporate and wealth taxation mechanisms.  As highlighted in another recent 
EQUINET publication, many foreign corporations are relocating massive profits 
earned in African countries with minimal tax revenue being collected by the African 
government (Bond, 2005).  Thus, there is an urgent need for improved tax collection 
systems in African countries in order to facilitate increasing government expenditure 
as a share of GDP. 
 
 11
Share of total government expenditure on health 
The final issue that influences government health spending levels is the share of total 
government expenditure devoted to the health sector, i.e. the extent to which health 
receives political priority relative to other sectors in the government expenditure 
decision-making process.  In most African countries, the education sector receives 
more than double the amount that the health sector receives (Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, 2002).  However, it should be recognised that improved 
educational status of the population has been shown to positively contribute to 
improved health status.  Nevertheless, it is critical for public health services to be 
adequately funded in order to secure substantial health status improvements.  It is of 
far greater concern that defence receives more resources than the health sector in 
most African countries.  It is unsurprising that countries experiencing civil conflict 
would have high levels of defence spending, e.g. over 25% of government spending 
in Burundi was devoted to defence in 1997-1998 compared with a mere 2.5% 
devoted to health and 15% on defence and less than 1% in the DRC.  However, it is 
concerning that nearly 11% of government expenditure is devoted to defence and 
only 4% to health in countries without conflict such as Cameroon (Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, 2002).  Advocacy around the Abuja commitment to 
devote 15% of government resources to health care is critical in changing this 
relative prioritisation between sectors. 
 
The other factor that constrains government’s ability to devote a higher percentage of 
total government spending to health is debt servicing and repayment.  Interest 
payments on debt accounted for 12% of total government expenditure in Zambia in 
1997-1998, 14% in Ghana, 22% in Cameroon and 26% in Kenya (Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, 2002).  This highlights the importance of considering 
ways of relieving the debt burden on African countries. 
 
HIPC & G8 debt relief 
As indicated earlier, there is some optimism that recent debt relief initiatives may 
allow African countries to increase the amount of tax funding devoted to health care 
expenditure.  The first major debt relief initiative was the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative.  It is worthwhile considering whether this initiative had a 
positive impact on health care expenditure in African countries that have benefited 
from it. 
 
HIPC is a joint initiative by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
developed in 1996 to provide a framework for multilateral and bilateral creditors to 
reduce the levels of sovereign debt owed to them by the poor countries identified as 
highly indebted. In order to understand the implications that the HIPC initiative may 
have for health financing it is important to understand its objectives and general 
functioning. The Original HIPC initiative (O-HIPC) was broadly defined and aimed to 
reduce the recipient country’s debt burden which clearly constrained economic 
growth and development.  The initiative has since evolved to what is called the 
Expanded HIPC (E-HIPC) which has been modified to include three clearly specified 
objectives which are to (Gautam, 2003): 
• Provide a permanent exit from debt rescheduling 
• Promote growth  
• Release resources for higher social spending targeted at poverty eradication. 
 
Qualification for HIPC debt relief occurs in two main stages; the first stage is called 
the Decision Point and the second stage is called the Completion Point. At the 
Decision Point, countries receive conditional interim debt relief if they have an interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a track record of macroeconomic stability 
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and have cleared all debt arrears (i.e. if the country had fallen behind in its debt 
repayments, they must pay off these outstanding amounts before they can receive 
interim debt relief). To receive the full amount of irrevocable debt relief at the 
Completion Point countries must maintain macroeconomic stability under the IMF’s 
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PGRF), implement the structural and social 
reforms (particularly in terms of focusing public spending on ‘poverty-reducing’ social 
services) agreed upon at the Decision Point and implement a PRSP successfully for 
one year. 
 
Exactly how the elimination of debt servicing will translate into economic growth and 
poverty reduction is not clear except that in order for countries to qualify they must 
have a PRSP in place which sets out plans, targets and measurable outcomes for 
social spending in support of poverty reduction. To date there are 38 countries 
identified for HIPC relief, 32 of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The aim of debt relief under HIPC is to release fiscal resources for social sector 
spending towards promoting growth and eradicating poverty. An interesting question 
is whether there is any evidence of countries at decision or completion point 
expanding their social spending, especially their health spending, and if there is 
competition between social sectors for additional resources or if there are specific 
social sectors which are noticeably receiving more funding. The evidence shows that 
general social spending in support of poverty reduction is indeed taking place and 
has been prioritised to increase in medium term expenditure planning (see Appendix 
C for an overview of trends in the 4 African countries that have reached the HIPC 
completion point – Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda).  However in most 
cases, the education sector is the major beneficiary while the health sector is 
receiving much smaller increases in general tax funding as a result of HIPC debt 
relief.  The dilemma between increased funding of education, which would positively 
(albeit indirectly) contribute to health status, and increased funding for health 
services, which are critical to achieving health status improvements was raised 
earlier. 
 
One of the criticisms of the HIPC initiative is that it translated into relatively small 
amounts of debt relief relative to the size of the total debt burden (McIntyre et al., 
2005). For example, at the end of 2002/03, Ethiopia (which is listed in the World 
Bank classification according to Gross National Income per capita in 2003 as having 
the lowest income level at US$ 90 of all countries) had a nominal stock of external 
debt amounting to US$6,845 million, which is slightly more than 100 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Debt relief to Ethiopia under the HIPC initiative in 2001/02 
amounted to $50 million (0.8 percent of GDP) and in 2002/03 totalled $62 million (0.9 
percent of GDP) (IMF and IDA, 2004). 
 
The most recent debt relief initiative, announced at the 2005 Gleneagles G8 Summit, 
“to cancel 100% of outstanding debts of eligible Heavily Indebted Poor Countries to 
the IMF, IDA [lending part of the World Bank] and African Development Fund” (G8, 
2005) appears to hold more promise than the initial HIPC initiative.  While the HIPC 
initiative focused only on relief for the interest payments on the debt, the latest 
proposal will also provide relief on the principal loan (i.e. the money borrowed).  In 
addition, it is required that the tax funds released through this debt relief be spent on 
social services.  However, the debt will not be ‘written off’ with the stroke of a pen.  
Instead, the debt relief will be provided over a period of 40 years which will once 
again translate into relatively small annual reductions in the debt burden (Abugre, 
2005).  There are also concerns about the conditionalities that have been tied to the 
G8 initiative. 
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Thus, while the G8 debt initiative is a small step in the right direction, African 
countries still face an overwhelming debt burden and hence substantial constraints 
on their ability to direct a greater share of their tax revenue towards health services. 
 
 
4.2 Donor funding 
As indicated previously, most African countries rely heavily on donor funding to 
support human, social and infrastructural development. Table 2 illustrates the varying 
degrees of foreign aid support experienced by 4 of the African countries that have 
reached the HIPC completion point, and reveals that most countries receive 
substantially more aid per capita than the total amount they manage to spend per 
capita on health (from all public and private health care financing sources). 
 
Table 2: Comparison of aid per capita and total health care  
expenditure per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2005) 
 
An analysis of donor support in a sample of Southern and East African countries 
(Table 3), shows that Mozambique and Zambia have consistently received the 
largest amount of aid per capita.  The table also shows the variability in donor 
support on a year to year basis. 
 
 
Table 3: Aid per capita, Selected Southern & East African countries 
Aid per capita (current US$) 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Kenya 10.53 17.02 15.08 12.55 15.15
Malawi 44.24 43.28 38.38 35.1 45.42
Mozambique 46.52 49.57 51.61 111.39 54.96
Tanzania 30.07 30.33 36.9 35.04 46.51
Zambia 64.37 80.43 34.66 62.54 53.84
Zimbabwe 19.71 14.08 12.75 15.43 14.22
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2005) 
 
The face of donor support has gradually changed, initially from project funding to 
support under a SWAp (Sector-Wide Approach) framework in liaison with sectoral 
ministries, and most recently to General Budget Support (GBS) in liaison with 
Ministries of Finance. 
 
The SWAp mechanism has been used to varying degrees in a growing number of 
African countries which rely heavily on donor funding. For example, a recent review 
indicated that Tanzania has the most well established SWAp making use of joint 
financing of sub-sectoral allocations (i.e. allocations to different components within 
the health sector), whilst Mozambique had only recently instituted pooled funding of 
government and donor funds within the health sector (Foster et al., 2000). 
HIPC Country 
 
Aid per 
capita 
(current US$)
Health Expenditure 
Per Capita (Current 
US$) 
Ethiopia   19.44   5 
Ghana   32.01 17 
Mozambique 111.39 11 
Uganda   25.94 18 
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SWAps can be a useful tool for ensuring that donor and government funds are 
redistributed to ensure health system equity. For example, a SWAp based on open 
participatory planning and implementation in principle ensures that the health needs 
identified by civil society and NGOs are factored into health sector planning which 
could also promote equity. Experience with SWAps has however shown limited 
participation of civil society thus compromising potential equity effects (Foster et al., 
2000).  This is an issue that is being addressed in some countries, such as Tanzania, 
where a range of civil society stakeholders are involved in the annual health sector 
review process (Personal communication – Dr Max Mapunda). One of the most 
important means by which SWAps could improve health system equity is by ensuring 
that resource allocation is planned and executed comprehensively within the sector 
in line with national needs and priorities, as opposed to on a per project basis which 
encourages disparities where some areas are well resourced and others receive no 
resources at all (Walford, 2002). This requires that government policies, planning, 
budgeting and resource allocation need to be equity focused (Pearson, 2002). 
 
General Budget Support (GBS) is a recently introduced mechanism used by some 
donor agencies to channel their funds through the central Ministry of Finance. These 
finance ministries are responsible for allocating, disbursing and managing these 
funds using the financial management, procurement and accountability systems 
already in place in government (DFID, 2004).  Thus, under GBS, donor funds are no 
longer given directly to the Ministry of Health, but the ultimate decision on how much 
donor (and government) funds are allocated to the health sector rests with the 
Ministry of Finance, in consultation with key stakeholders, including donors providing 
GBS. DFID, which is one of the donors that has chosen to adopt a GBS approach, 
terms this kind of approach Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) and has 
identified it as “the aid instrument most likely to support a relationship between donor 
and developing country partners which will help to build the accountability and 
capability of the state” (DFID, 2004). According to DFID, the motivations of donors for 
this shift to GBS include: 
¾ Increased ownership, empowerment and alignment of external funds with the 
national budget process and national priorities; 
¾ Improved policy dialogue between governments and donors on key expenditure 
priorities, measures and implementation processes; 
¾ Increased harmonisation of donor activities, benchmarks, reporting requirements 
and conditionalities; 
¾ Increased predictability of donor funding over the medium term thus allowing for 
comprehensive planning of service delivery activities; 
¾ Decreased transaction costs over the medium term as donor agencies would over 
time be using government’s own accounting and reporting systems for monitoring; 
¾ Improved efficiency in public expenditure management, expanded and more 
effective service delivery and more robust delivery institutions; and 
¾ Potential for increased democratic accountability as the budgeting and planning 
system becomes more transparent allowing for more accountability. 
 
There are some concerns about whether the health sector will receive a ‘fair share’ of 
donor funds under this arrangement.  As noted earlier, the education sector receives 
greater priority than the health sector in the allocation of existing and any additional 
funds released from debt relief initiatives.  While this may be appropriate, more 
attention does need to be paid to the relative prioritisation between the social sectors.  
Another concern is that this could potentially undermine the role of the Ministry of 
Health in crucial areas of health policy, particularly in relation to health care financing.  
Given that Ministries of Finance wield considerable power in many African 
governments and are frequently more responsive to donor demands than sectoral 
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Ministries, it is possible that donors could attempt to impose their health sector 
priorities (especially their views on health care financing strategies) via applying 
pressure on Treasury officials who in turn could apply pressure on Ministry of Health 
officials.  A key issue is how the Ministry of Health manages its relationship with the 
Ministry of Finance as the ‘guardian’ of the budget, and its relationship with donor 
agencies. The health sector appears not to be marginalised4 in situations where a 
country has aligned its priorities and strategic plans for pro-poor service delivery in 
line with a PRSP, where specific targets related to heath care financing and delivery 
have been set, and process and outcome indicators are available for monitoring 
progress.  It is essential that such monitoring actually occurs, rather than being a 
theoretical possibility.  It is also important that civil society plays an active role in the 
monitoring process. 
 
While some donor agencies such as DFID are focusing on general budget support, 
recent global initiatives like the President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) and the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), which hope to 
provide funding of US$10-16 billion annually and US$3 billion for 5 years respectively 
(Berman, 2004), may be re-introducing vertical approaches to donor funding.  
Despite the move towards SWAps and GBS by some agencies, many donors still 
prefer to provide finances conditional upon the finances being directed to specific 
programs, or what Berman refers to as ‘international priorities’ such as the MDGs. 
This may have a positive or a negative impact on the health sector of affected 
countries. External funding for specific priorities relieves the burden on the state, but 
may result in long term capacity deficiencies within government generally and the 
health system specifically in responding to these critical problems. External funding 
specifically directed at health sector priority areas such as HIV/AIDS and TB may 
effectively replace government spending and result in entrenching decreased levels 
of internal funding of these services which may be politically impossible to increase 
when external funding is reduced. At present, there is a dearth of empirical evidence 
on the extent to which these global initiatives5 reinforce vertical approaches and their 
impact on health system functioning. 
 
In summary, many African countries remain heavily dependent on donor funding for 
health services.  There have been two divergent trends in recent years, with 
increased co-ordination of donor funding and pooling of donor funds with those of 
government on the one hand and the re-introduction of programmatic donor funding 
for ‘high priority’ disease interventions on the other hand.  While donor funding will 
continue to be an important source of health care funding for the foreseeable future, 
there is a growing urgency in the search for sustainable and equitable domestic 
sources of finance, not least of all due to the unpredictability of donor funding. 
 
4.3 Out-of-pocket payments 
Out-of-pocket payments take two major forms, namely user fees for public sector 
health services and direct payments to private sector providers.  User fees have 
been the major focus in health care financing debates in Africa and thus are 
considered in some detail here. 
 
4.3.1 Brief overview of user fees: history, objectives and impact 
There were two major contributory factors to the rapid growth in explicit policies of 
charging user fees for government health services in African countries.  Firstly, 
                                                 
4 Examples include HIPC countries with GBS such as Uganda, where the focus is on pro-poor 
spending and delivery based on the specifications agreed upon in the PRSP. 
5 Rotary International’s commitment to polio eradication is an additional example of these 
global initiatives committed to providing financial support for specific disease priorities. 
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various international organisations vociferously advocated for the introduction of user 
fees (Akin et al., 1987, de Ferranti, 1985, Jimenez, 1987). The World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund were in a particularly strong position to influence policy 
in African countries as user fees and other cost recovery mechanisms were often an 
integral part of these institutions’ loan conditionality and associated Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).  Secondly, macro-economic difficulties in many 
countries (related to low or negative economic growth and increasing indebtedness) 
limited the resources available to government for financing and providing health 
services and led to financing strategies that increasingly placed the burden on 
service users (Bennett, 1992, Gilson and Mills, 1995). 
 
From the perspective of national governments, two objectives were most frequently 
cited when introducing or increasing user fees.  These were revenue generation and 
improvement in quality of public sector health services, particularly through 
availability of medicines at facilities (Nolan and Turbat, 1995). It was anticipated that 
user fees would generate significant revenue to cover the health care financing gap 
facing government health services in African countries. Another objective that was 
set in some countries was to enhance community involvement in the management 
and ‘taking ownership’ of local facilities. 
 
International organisations which favoured user fees as a cost-recovery mechanism 
suggested there were a host of other ‘benefits’ of fees.  These included the idea that 
user fees prevent unnecessary or frivolous health service utilisation and send ‘price 
signals’ to patients about the cost of services at different levels of care and thereby 
promote appropriate use and adherence to referral mechanisms (Akin et al., 1987, de 
Ferranti, 1985). They also argued that providers are more likely to be responsive to 
patients’ needs and concerns and to provide good quality care when patients are 
paying for services.  Finally, it was suggested that fees would promote equity in that 
those who could afford to pay would ease the burden on government who could then 
concentrate its resources on the poor. 
 
However, the experience of user fees in African countries has been dismal relative to 
these objectives.  For example, fees have on average tended to generate revenue of 
less than 5 percent of total operating costs (Creese, 1991), although they may cover 
a sizeable proportion of non-salary operating costs (Creese and Kutzin, 1995).  
When the collection and other fee related administration costs are taken into account, 
net revenue is even lower.  The evidence also highlights that the introduction or 
increase in fees usually leads to dramatic declines in health service utilisation (e.g. of 
two-thirds in Ghana, over 50% in Kenya, and by a third in Zambia), particularly for the 
most vulnerable groups (Blas and Limbambala, 2001, Frankish, 1986, Hussein and 
Mujinja, 1997, Kipp et al., 2001, Mwabu et al., 1995, Waddington and Enyimayew, 
1989, Waddington and Enyimayew, 1990). While some argue that user fees will 
mainly prevent unnecessary or frivolous health service utilisation, this argument does 
not recognise that the use of health services is seldom costless. Time, transport 
costs and other costs of obtaining health care can be significant, which will already 
deter ‘unnecessary’ utilisation (Abel-Smith and Rawal, 1992). There appears to be 
little or no explicit targeting of revenue receipts to extend and improve services for 
the poor. As noted by Gilson et al (1995: 380), who conducted an extensive literature 
review, “no study was found which directly assessed whether fee revenue use has 
disproportionately benefited the poor or the nature and extent of cross-subsidies 
within user fee systems”.  The African experience also demonstrates that exemption 
mechanisms, particularly those aimed at protecting the poor, are frequently 
ineffective (Gilson et al., 1995, McPake et al., 1992, Willis and Leighton, 1995). The 
Ghanaian experience summarised in Box 1 exemplifies problems with exemptions 
found throughout Africa. 
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Box 1: Fee exemptions in Ghana 
There are a range of official exemptions in Ghana, including specific services (those for major 
communicable diseases, immunisations, antenatal and post-natal care) as well as certain 
services for specified demographic and socio-economic groups (children under five years, 
pregnant women, the elderly/people above 70 years and ‘paupers’).  Most importantly, the 
Ghanaian government has an explicit mechanism for funding exemptions in that facilities can 
submit a statement of fee revenue ‘lost’ through exemptions and request reimbursement. This 
is a major innovation as exemptions are ‘unfunded’ in most countries, leaving health care 
providers with weak incentives to exempt patients from fees. 
 
Despite having a relatively comprehensive policy, there is considerable evidence that the 
exemption policy is poorly implemented.  For example, one study in the Volta region of Ghana 
found that 84% of patients who were eligible for exemptions did not receive them (Nyonator 
and Kutzin, 1999).  A more recent national study found that almost half of the clients 
interviewed who were eligible for exemptions had in fact paid for services (Garshong et al., 
2002). Research has also highlighted that the poor very seldom receive exemptions while the 
demographic categories (under-fives, elderly and pregnant women) are more frequently 
exempted (Adams et al., 2002). 
 
Several factors contribute to the lower than desirable effectiveness of exemption 
implementation practice (Garshong et al., 2002).  One factor is the lack of clarity among 
health service providers about the exemption policy (who is exempted and for which specific 
services). Another factor is that certain patient categories, such as pregnant women, are 
easier to identify than others.  While there are sometimes difficulties in establishing the 
exemption eligibility of patients on the basis of age, the most serious problem relates to 
identifying ‘paupers’.  There are also obstacles on the health service user side.  A national 
survey of patients found that while most patients knew of the policy, the level of awareness of 
specific exemption categories was poor. Of even greater concern is that many patients who 
are aware of their eligibility for exemption sometimes do not exercise their rights due to fear of 
negative confrontations with providers.  Barriers to seeking and obtaining exemptions are 
likely to be particularly severe for the poor given the stigma attached to applying for ‘pauper’ 
status in a crowded health facility.  Finally, insufficient funds have been set aside for 
exemption reimbursements and there are often lengthy delays in disbursing these funds. 
 
4.3.2 Household level consequences of fees 
The limited revenue generating potential and adverse utilisation consequences of 
fees, as well as the ineffectiveness of exemption mechanisms in protecting the most 
vulnerable groups, have been extensively documented in African countries, 
particularly since the early 1990s.  A more recent focus has been the consequences 
of charging users for public sector health services at the household level, both in 
terms of treatment seeking decision-making (whether or not one seeks care when ill 
and which providers are used) and their effect on household livelihoods. 
 
In South Africa, a national household survey of health needs and health care 
affordability, conducted just after the introduction of free care services for young 
children and pregnant women, showed that 22 percent of African interviewees 
reported having been refused treatment on the grounds of being unable to pay. 
Approximately 54 percent of unemployed Africans, and 18 percent of white-collar 
workers reported not seeking treatment as they felt unable to pay for it (Hirschowitz 
and Orkin, 1995).  A survey in Tanzania among individuals who had used health 
services in the preceding four weeks indicated that 84 percent of rural dwellers found 
it either difficult or very difficult to find money for health service utilisation, while 81 
percent of urban dwellers experienced similar problems (Abel-Smith and Rawal, 
1992).  A more recent study in one rural district in Tanzania found that 73% of the 
poorest households cited lack of funds as the reason for not seeking care for a 
reported chronic illness, while none of the richest households reported being unable 
to afford health care for chronic illness (Save the Children, 2005).  The 1994 
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Demographic and Health Survey in Zimbabwe indicated that 42% of the urban poor 
and 14% of the rural poor cited inability to afford health care fees when indicating 
why they had not sought care for an illness they reported experiencing in the 
previous month (Bitrán and Giedion, 2002).  In Burundi, 34% reported not seeking 
care due to lack of funds (Bate and Witter, 2003) and in a rural district in Ethiopia, 
over two-thirds gave this as the reason for not seeking care (McIntyre et al., 2005).  
Similar results have been found in many other African countries and demonstrate 
that user fees create a major barrier to accessing health care when needed, 
particularly for the poor. 
 
For those who do seek health care when they are ill, the direct costs of obtaining 
such care can account for a substantial proportion of households’ income.  Payments 
for health services and medicines accounted for an average of 4-5% of household 
incomes in the African countries included in one study (Makinen et al., 2000).    
When other direct costs associated with obtaining care (such as transport costs) are 
included, some studies have found that total direct costs can be as high as 10% of 
household income (Lucas and Nuwagaba, 1999).  The direct costs of long-term fatal 
illness, particularly AIDS, have the most devastating effects on households.  A study 
in Tanzania has estimated that the direct costs of treatment for a person living with 
AIDS during a six month period is about 64% of per capita household income for the 
same period (Tibaijuka, 1997).  There is consistent evidence that the heaviest burden 
of health care costs, particularly those that are considered catastrophic, falls on the 
poorest households (Xu et al., 2003).  For example, a study in Malawi found that the 
cost of malaria to households was over 7% of their income on average, but for the 
poorest households, these costs were as much as a third of their income (Ettling et 
al., 1994). 
 
One of the first strategies of coping with the costs of illness is to try to avoid these 
costs altogether “by modifying illness perception (the phenomenon of ignoring 
disease)” (Sauerborn et al., 1996).  The poor often delay seeking care until an illness 
is severe, which may ultimately lead to higher costs of treatment (e.g. if the person 
has to be admitted to hospital). Self-treatment using allopathic or traditional 
medicines available at home, or purchased from a drug seller or traditional healer at 
a relatively lower cost than at public facilities (and sometimes on credit), is another 
frequent strategy for avoiding or at least minimising costs (McIntyre et al., 2005, Save 
the Children, 2005).  Where costs are incurred, households use coping strategies 
such as reducing consumption (including of basic necessities), selling assets and 
borrowing (McIntyre et al., 2005).  A recent study in Ethiopia found that households 
which had used available cash to pay for health care had intended to use the money 
for basic consumption needs including food, fuel, clothes and education (Russell and 
Abdella, 2002).  Assets sold may include those that are essential to the household’s 
future livelihood such as livestock and land.  Borrowing to cover health care 
expenses is extremely widespread in Africa, and while some are able to access loans 
from family and friends at low or no interest, others have to accept loans at ruinous 
interest rates.  A survey in Tanzania found that 40% of respondents had borrowed 
money to pay for health services used in the preceding four weeks (Abel-Smith and 
Rawal, 1992).  Another study found that between 25% and 49% of respondents in 
surveys in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Guinea and Burundi borrowed money from family 
and friends to pay for health services (McPake et al., 1993).  In Burundi, levels of 
borrowing to cover health care costs were found to be 35% in the poorest quintile 
(Bate and Witter, 2003); in Khartoum, Sudan they were 57% on average for all 
groups (Witter, 2005); and in a Tanzanian rural district were 63% in the poorest 
group and 43% in the richest group (Save the Children, 2005).  As McPake et al 
(1993: 1391-1392) have noted, “the evidence suggests that when ill, most people 
seem to find amounts of money which appear large in relation to their regular 
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incomes. This is probably a tribute to the informal risk sharing mechanism of the 
extended family and other community support mechanisms. Nevertheless, it 
highlights the plight of those who fall through this safety net for whom even charges 
for very basic care may be prohibitive.” 
 
There is growing international evidence that health care costs may plunge 
households into poverty and that the likelihood of a poor household ever being able 
to move out of poverty diminishes when confronted with illness-related costs 
(Whitehead et al., 2001).  Recently, the WHO has estimated that 100 million people 
become impoverished by paying for health care each year and that a further 150 
million face severe financial hardship from health care costs (World Health 
Organisation, 2005).  While household impoverishment through health care costs is 
particularly related to catastrophic illness, even routine ambulatory care with so-
called nominal fees can worsen the situation of extremely poor households. 
 
The available evidence on the impact of illness and health care costs at household 
level clearly demonstrates that the most vulnerable households face enormous 
constraints in accessing care when they are required to pay user fees, particularly 
where geographic access is poor and other costs of treatment seeking are high (e.g. 
for transport).  With the high levels of poverty throughout Africa, household 
livelihoods are so fragile that if a member does have to use health services and pay 
fees at the time of service use, the household may have to take actions to access 
cash that could lead to further impoverishment. 
 
4.3.3 Reversing user fee policies 
The evidence about the adverse consequences of user fees for household 
livelihoods is so overwhelming that even the arch protagonist of user fees in the 
1980s and 1990s, the World Bank, has acknowledged that “Out-of-pocket payments 
for health services – especially hospital care – can make the difference between a 
household being poor or not” (Claeson et al., 2001) and indicates that alternative 
financing mechanisms such as insurance may be preferable.  Another institution that 
has historically supported user fees, the US government, in its 2001 foreign 
appropriations bill report requires the US Congress to oppose any World Bank, IMF 
or other multilateral development bank loan which includes user fees for basic health 
or education services, and to report to Congress within 10 days if any loan or other 
agreement is approved which includes such fees (US Network for Global Economic 
Justice, 2003). 
 
Even though it is encouraging that the key International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
that have historically insisted that African countries levy user fees for public sector 
health (and other social) services are changing their position, and that there is 
increasing explicit international advocacy for the removal of fees (e.g. by Save the 
Children and the British government), the challenge of reversing fee policies is 
enormous.  Some African countries, most notably South Africa and Uganda, have 
already abolished all or some user fees and their experience provides some useful 
insights. 
 
South African experience of fee removal 
South Africa was one of the first countries to initiate fee removal, which has occurred 
in two phases. The first phase involved the removal of fees for all health services at 
all public sector facilities for pregnant women and children under the age of six years, 
which came into effect on 1 June 1994. Announced by President Mandela in his first 
address after the elections (May 24, 1994), this policy was clearly seen to be of major 
national importance. The second phase was the removal of all fees for primary care 
services on 1 April 1996. 
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Although the ‘free primary health care’ policy has never been comprehensively 
analysed, there was a detailed evaluation of the first phase of fee removal.  This 
evaluation reported largely positive effects of the fee removal, with health service 
utilisation increasing substantially and pregnant women started attending ante-natal 
care at an earlier stage (McCoy, 1996). However, some concerns were raised about 
the potential for increased curative care utilisation to crowd out preventive care 
utilisation (Wilkinson et al., 2001). 
 
There were also a number of problems with the implementation of this policy.  Firstly, 
all health workers and managers, with the exception of a few of the most senior 
national health department officials, first heard about the policy when the President 
announced it a few days before it was due to be implemented.  Thus, there was no 
time to adequately plan and drug supplies were quickly exhausted as utilisation 
increased massively.  Secondly, the number and proportion of visits at tertiary 
hospitals by young children and pregnant women that could have been treated at 
lower levels increased after the removal of fees.  This inappropriate use of higher 
level services was ascribed to the design of the policy, which did not specify that 
patients had to follow the referral route.  Finally, and probably most importantly, there 
has been a negative impact on health worker morale.  There was considerable health 
worker resentment about the process of introducing the policy, particularly that they 
had not been consulted or had an opportunity to plan for its implementation (McCoy, 
1996, Walker and Gilson, 2004).  The lack of communication, particularly about the 
reasons underlying it, has resulted in health workers and lower level managers 
forming their own opinions, frequently negative, about the value of this policy 
(McIntyre and Klugman, 2003).  Health workers indicated that the policy exacerbated 
poor working conditions, particularly overcrowding and staff shortages at health 
facilities. In particular, frontline health workers feared that patients would abuse this 
policy, with some arguing that it “would encourage women to become pregnant”, 
although there is no empirical evidence that this has occurred (McCoy, 1996). 
 
As indicated previously, the removal of fees from all public sector primary care 
services has not been evaluated systematically to date.  However, analysis of a 
panel household survey dataset in one rural province showed quite large increases in 
the use of public sector primary care facilities after this policy, although the increase 
was below average for the poorest group (Personal communication – Dr Jane 
Goudge, Centre for Health Policy). 
 
Ugandan experience of fee removal 
Uganda introduced user fees on a universal basis in 1993, in order to meet a World 
Bank loan conditionality (Okuonzi, 2004).  Although revenue generation was 
relatively low (generally less than 5% of expenditure), it was an important source of 
funds for supplementing health worker salaries, maintaining facilities and purchasing 
additional drugs (Burnham et al., 2004).  However, there were growing concerns 
about the consequences of user fees, particularly for the poor. In 1999, a 
Participatory Poverty Assessment highlighted the extent of the impact on the poor 
and the level of grassroots dissatisfaction with the policy (Okuonzi, 2004, Yates, 
2004).  
 
User fees at public sector facilities were abolished in March 2001, with the exception 
of private wards (Yates, 2004). Various studies have shown that utilisation of health 
services increased immediately and dramatically.  One study of 78 health facilities in 
10 districts, using data for 8 months before and 12 months after the removal of fees, 
found that the mean monthly number of new visits increased by 53%, although in the 
case of children <5 years of age the increase was only 27%, while repeat visits 
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increased by 24% overall but by 81% for children <5.  Although immunisations, 
antenatal services and family planning had always been free, utilisation of these 
services also increased (by 17%, 25% and 32% respectively) after the removal of 
fees (Burnham et al., 2004).  Two years after the abolition of fees, sustained 
utilisation increases of 77% were recorded (Yates, 2004). 
 
An extensive study using the first and second Ugandan National Household Surveys 
(conducted in 1999/2000 and 2002/03 respectively) and data from the Health 
Management Information System highlighted that the poor had particularly benefited 
from the removal of fees (Deininger and Mpuga, 2004).  Although the incidence of 
reported illness in the previous 30 days was similar in the two surveys (of slightly less 
than 30%), the percentage of those who were sick who sought professional care 
increased from 69% to 79% and the number of days when the sick person was 
unable to work declined from 8.3 to 7 days on average.  In addition, 30% of those 
who did not seek care cited inability to afford health care as the reason in 2002/03 
compared to 50% in 1999/2000.  The poor benefited most from the abolition of fees; 
utilisation of health services when ill increased from 58% to 70% in the case of the 
poorest quintile and from 80% to 85% for those in the richest quintile.  A key finding 
of this study was that although there were substantial differences in use of health 
services when ill between the rich and the poor while fees were in place, these 
differences were completely eliminated in the case of children (but not in the case of 
adults) after the removal of fees.  Given that the removal of fees does not eliminate 
all costs of illness and treatment seeking, such as transport to a facility and time lost 
to productive activities, the above finding suggests that in the poorest households 
children will be taken to a health care facility when ill whereas adults will avoid 
seeking treatment if possible so as to avoid non-user fee direct costs and losing 
productive work time to seek care. 
 
A number of the studies have highlighted that these sustained utilisation increases, 
and related positive outcomes such as national immunisation coverage increases 
from 41% in 1999/2000 to 84% in 2002/03 (Yates, 2004), could not have been 
achieved without an increase in the resources available for public sector health 
services.  Of particular importance was the pro-active provision of a $5.5 million 
buffer fund by the Ministry of Health to offset the potential impact on availability of 
drugs arising from the loss of fee revenue and utilisation increases (Burnham et al., 
2004).  In addition, the move away from project-specific donor funds to the pooling of 
donor funds with Ministry of Health funds under a SWAp initiative resulted in the 
Ministry budget doubling in real terms between 1999/2000 and 2002/03.  The 
Ministry has control over the allocation of these SWAp resources and has directed 
the additional resources preferentially to primary health care services; district 
budgets have increased seven-fold since 1999/2000 (Yates, 2004).  The important 
role of donor funding (and one large donor in particular) in facilitating the removal of 
user fees in Uganda should be recognised, not least of all because of the potential 
difficulties of sustaining this level of district budgets if one or more donors should 
decide to withdraw their health sector support in Uganda. 
 
While there is overwhelming evidence of the substantial positive consequences of 
fee removal in Uganda, particularly for the poorest, there have been some negative 
consequences.  Of particular concern is the decline in staff morale (Burnham et al., 
2004).    This is related to the loss of fee revenue which had previously been used to 
supplement staff salaries, as well as the fact that workload had increased by about 
47%.  Health workers and members of the health facility management committees 
also indicated that maintenance of health facilities and cleanliness had declined.  It 
should be noted, however, that these findings were obtained in the twelve months 
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after the fee removal.  The more recent substantial increases in primary care facility 
budgets may have improved staff workload ratios. 
 
Key issues arising from the experience of user fee removal 
All of the information from the two African country experiences of user fee removal 
indicates that abolishing user fees for at least some health services has reduced 
financial barriers to access and resulted in immediate and dramatic service utilisation 
increases.  In some cases, this has been shown to particularly benefit the poor, but in 
other cases there are remaining barriers to access (such as geographic distance and 
associated time and transport costs) that limit the extent to which the poor are able to 
benefit.  Thus, fee removal should be seen as only one component of a 
comprehensive package to improve the availability, affordability and quality of public 
sector health services (Gilson and McIntyre, 2005). 
 
The African experience of fee removal to date also clearly demonstrates that fee 
removal cannot occur overnight.  There is a need for careful planning and for 
improved resource availability if fees are removed, not only to offset any fee revenue 
lost (which is frequently very low), but more importantly to continue to provide 
adequate quality services in the face of increased utilisation.  Plans for increased 
drug supplies are particularly important, and it is critical to monitor staff workloads 
and to address staff shortages where they arise.  It is also essential to adequately 
communicate with frontline health workers, to explain the reasons for fee removal 
and to promote their support for the policy, as well as to fully inform the general 
public of changes in fee policies (Gilson and McIntyre, 2005). 
 
Remaining concerns about fee removal 
Some African countries are seriously considering the removal of some or all user 
fees, while others remain convinced that fees are a ‘necessary evil’.  There are 
anecdotal indications that in some cases, unwillingness to even consider removing 
user fees is linked to resistance to ‘imperialist’ interventions.  African governments 
were in most cases forced by international organisations to introduce user fees, often 
as part of structural adjustment programs, a few decades ago.  Now international 
organisations are attempting to impose their preference for removing user fees.  It is 
unsurprising that some governments are resisting this latest attempt by international 
organisations to exert influence over domestic policies.  It is for this reason that 
Gilson and McIntyre (2005) called “for sensitivity in how international donors and 
agencies approach African countries on the issue of fee removal”. 
 
Another concern expressed by African countries that are under pressure from 
international organisations to remove fees is that there will be ‘excessive’ use of 
health services that are free at the point of use.  To some, this may appear to reflect 
one of the initial arguments in favour of imposing fees, namely that it will reduce 
‘frivolous’ use.  To others, it is simply a case of recognising that as African health 
systems suffer from a serious shortage of skilled health personnel, drug supplies and 
other resources, any increase in utilisation will further overextend existing services.  
As indicated previously, there is consensus that if fees are removed, additional health 
care resources must be made available to avoid these consequences (and other 
sections of this paper critically review how one may generate these additional 
resources).  The key question to consider is whether the increased utilisation that will 
result from the removal of fees represents previously unmet need or reflects 
unnecessary use (recognising that patients incur some costs other than fees in 
accessing services).  
 
We are of the view that the increased utilisation that will arise is very largely related 
to previously unmet need.  There is considerable evidence from household surveys 
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that many do not use services despite suffering from chronic illnesses and severe 
acute illnesses.  In addition, utilisation levels in most African countries are extremely 
low; in many countries it is less than 1 health care visit per person per annum.  For 
example, the national average utilisation of primary care services in Rwanda in 1999 
was only 0.2 visits per person per year (Schneider and Diop, 2004).  A ‘normative’ 
estimation of appropriate health service utilisation levels was undertaken in South 
Africa, based on the burden of disease and need for preventive services (e.g. 
incidence of tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy rate, number 
of young children requiring immunisations etc. and number of visits required in each 
instance).  The initial estimate in the mid 1990s was that there should be an average 
of 3.5 visits per person per year to appropriately address the primary health care 
needs of South Africans (Rispel et al., 1996).  This was revised last year to take 
account of the increased need for HIV/AIDS related treatment and is now estimated 
to be 3.85 visits per person per year.  While this level of expected utilisation is based 
on a relatively comprehensive primary care service package, it is not unrealistic.  For 
example, almost every district in Botswana reports at least 4 visits per year to public 
sector facilities per capita (Bloom and Lenneiye, 1989). 
 
Unfortunately, the debate about ‘excessive’ versus ‘needed’ health service utilisation 
has become a heated one, with little clear evidence.  Two actions may contribute to 
reaching some conclusion to this debate in order that individual countries can make 
well-informed decisions on whether or not it is appropriate to remove fees.  Firstly, it 
may be helpful for countries to estimate what an appropriate primary health care 
utilisation rate would be within the context of their burden of disease and other 
indicators of need for primary care services.  This can then be compared with current 
national average utilisation rates to assess whether utilisation is at ‘acceptable’ levels 
or whether there is a clear indication that there is unmet need.  The normative level 
should also be compared with household survey data on utilisation rates across 
different socio-economic groups to assess whether the poorest groups (who usually 
bear the greatest burden of ill health) have appropriate utilisation levels relative to 
this norm.  Such utilisation ‘norms’ (or target utilisation rates) are also extremely 
helpful in estimating the additional resources that would be required if utilisation 
increased to the target rate and to identify specific geographic areas (e.g. health 
districts) that are in particular need of additional resources to increase utilisation 
rates to appropriate levels.  Secondly, it is necessary to provide accurate empirical 
evidence on what is referred to as unnecessary or excessive use of health care 
services in order to understand the magnitude of the problem and identify alternative 
ways of addressing any problems identified (to avoid the danger of fees preventing 
unmet need being met).  It may be that this ‘excessive’ use is related to relatively 
‘minor’ ailments.  This may require community education, but it should be borne in 
mind that most patients are not in a position to assess whether symptoms are serious 
or whether they can be ignored safely and that people are unlikely to incur the 
frequently heavy time costs of seeking care at public sector facilities for trivial 
ailments (Abel-Smith and Rawal, 1992).  In South Africa, research at primary care 
facilities indicated that the major burden of ‘unnecessary’ use of services was related 
to people requesting a ‘sick certificate’ to justify not going to work (Personal 
communication – District Manager in Cape Town Metropole).  The solution in this 
case was not to impose fees on all patients but to simply screen patients and refer 
those seeking sick certificates to private doctors (as they were employed in the 
formal sector, they could probably afford this and it relieved the burden on public 
sector facilities). 
 
In summary, the issue of whether to retain user fees at public sector facilities or to 
remove them is one of the most critical debates for each African country to explore.  
We believe that this issue should be widely debated within individual countries, and 
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that such debate should be evidence-based.  In countries where fee removal is 
agreed upon, careful planning and implementation of the policy is required. 
 
4.3.4 Direct payments to private sector providers 
So much attention has been focussed on user fees for public services that the 
sizeable component of out-of-pocket payments in the form of direct spending on 
private providers is often overlooked. These providers include both not-for-profit 
NGOs, particularly mission facilities in the African context, and private for-profit 
providers.  The use of private providers is widespread in African countries, even 
among relatively low income groups.  For example, one comparative analysis of 
health service utilisation patterns in African, Asian and Latin American countries 
(based on household survey data) found that, of those who had sought care when ill 
in the previous 2 weeks, 20% had used a private provider in Zambia while 58% had 
done so in South Africa.  In South Africa, private sector use was heavily concentrated 
in the higher income groups (83% of the highest income quintile had used private 
providers compared with 37% in the lowest income quintile) while the variation 
across income groups was much lower in Zambia (22% in the highest income quintile 
and 16% in the lowest income quintile) (Makinen et al., 2000). 
 
Mission health facilities play a critical role in many African countries.  In some 
instances, a mission hospital is the only facility in a particular rural area and will then 
frequently be the designated district hospital and receive government financial 
support and/or secondment of government health professionals to work in the facility.  
However, even when there is a strong collaborative relationship between missions 
and the Ministry of Health, mission facilities tend to receive far less government 
funding than publicly-owned facilities.  They tend to charge higher fees than public 
sector facilities in order to generate the additional resources that they need, although 
they may also receive foreign grants to support their activities.  The issues raised 
above in relation to user fees at public sector facilities also apply to mission facilities.  
The key difference is that mission facilities can only consider removing user fees if 
they are guaranteed sufficient financial allocations from government or donor 
sources. 
 
The category of private for-profit providers ranges from doctors and other health 
professionals working in private practice to informal drug sellers and traditional 
healers.  While utilisation of these services may arise from cultural or other 
preferences, it should be recognised that not all of this use of private providers is 
from ‘choice’; for example, where a patient attending a public sector facility whose 
drug supply is finished has to go to a private pharmacy or informal drug seller to 
access these drugs.  
 
The growth of private sector health care provision and use of private providers has 
been an explicit policy objective in many African countries.  Once again, this policy is 
linked both to constraints on governments’ ability to meet all the health care needs of 
their populations (related to macroeconomic and budgetary constraints) as well as to 
the policy prescriptions of IFIs, imposed through loan conditionalities and other 
coercive mechanisms.  Out-of-pocket payments to private providers is not considered 
in detail here as this requires detailed consideration of the equity implications of the 
continued commercialisation of health service provision (as opposed to health care 
financing), other than to note that they are, along with user fees, the most regressive 
form of financing health services and that strategies for addressing the burden on 
households of these payments include private sector regulatory mechanisms, 
improvement of quality of care in public sector facilities and pre-payment financing 
mechanisms. 
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4.4 Health insurance 
4.4.1 Brief overview of different types of health insurance schemes 
As indicated previously, there is very limited health insurance in African countries but 
it is a health care financing option that is increasingly coming under the policy 
spotlight.  This section provides a brief overview of the different forms that health 
insurance can take, drawing on the limited experience in Africa as well as the vast 
experience in Europe, other high-income countries and middle-income countries in 
Asia and Latin America.  One of the key features that distinguish different types of 
health insurance is whether or not there is a legal requirement to belong to health 
insurance.  Mandatory health insurance is a term used to describe insurance 
systems where there is a legal requirement for certain groups or the entire population 
to become members, while voluntary health insurance is used to describe systems 
where there is no such legal requirement. 
 
Within the category of mandatory insurance, social health insurance is the term that 
is generally used to refer to a system where only certain groups are legally required 
to become members and where only those who make insurance contributions are 
entitled to benefit from, or are ‘covered’ by, the insurance scheme.  In contrast, the 
term national health insurance generally refers to an insurance system that is 
universal, or covers the entire population irrespective of whether they have 
personally contributed to the scheme or not (e.g. where government fully subsidises 
the contributions of particularly vulnerable groups).  However, it should be noted that 
this terminology is not used consistently, with social and national health insurance 
often being used inter-changeably.  Mandatory insurance contributions are 
‘community-rated’, i.e. they are based on the average expected cost of health service 
use for the entire insured group instead of taking an individual’s or group’s risk of 
illness into account. Contributions may be a flat rate or may be differentiated by 
income level and sometimes the number of dependents covered.  There may be a 
single fund or a number of funds that together make up the mandatory insurance 
scheme.  In the latter case, a standardised, prescribed minimum benefit package is 
usually specified in the enabling legislation. In addition, there is usually a risk-
equalisation mechanism which effectively pools the contribution revenue of all of the 
schemes and individual schemes are allocated an amount which reflects the 
expected costs of that fund or scheme based on the illness risk of its membership 
(through a risk-adjusted capitation payment). 
 
Voluntary health insurance has historically referred to health insurance cover that is 
employment based, i.e. employees in a particular company or industry join a health 
insurance scheme and the contribution is shared by the employees and employers.  
Where the insurance is run by a commercial company on a for-profit basis, 
contributions tend to be ‘risk-rated’, where each person’s or group’s insurance 
contribution is related to the risk of illness or the expected cost of service use (i.e. the 
elderly and those with chronic conditions pay a higher contribution).  However, some 
voluntary, employment-based insurance groups charge ‘community-rated’ 
contributions, frequently because there is a regulatory requirement to do so.  A more 
recent type of voluntary health insurance that is quite widespread in Africa is that of 
community-based health insurance schemes (also called mutual health insurance, 
community-based pre-payment schemes or community health funds).  These are 
schemes that exist within localised communities, most frequently in rural areas, 
where members make small payments (often on an annual basis after the harvest 
time) to the scheme, which then covers their user fees at health services.  They may 
be initiated by the community themselves, a health facility within the community (e.g. 
a mission hospital), by central government or by a donor. 
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Some of the key issues from recent African experience of these different health 
insurance schemes are raised in the following sections. 
 
4.4.2 Private voluntary employment-based insurance 
This form of health insurance has been in existence for many decades (the first one 
being established in South Africa in 1889 (McLeod, 2005)) in a number of Southern 
African countries (particularly South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia) and is usually 
referred to as a ‘medical scheme’.  Medical schemes began as non-profit 
organisations, as a way for private firms to provide for the health care needs of their 
employees.  Contributions to the schemes were made by both employers and 
employees and were community rated.  Initially, the vast majority of medical schemes 
were ‘closed schemes’ in that membership of each scheme was only open to 
employees of an individual company.  This has changed over time (particularly in 
South Africa and to a lesser extent in Zimbabwe), with schemes becoming ‘open’, i.e. 
allowing anyone to join (except in some cases high risk individuals). 
 
The experience with these schemes, particularly over the past few decades, has not 
been entirely positive.  Some of the key concerns, which are illustrated using South 
African data due the fact that it is more readily accessible but reflect consistent 
trends in other countries with such schemes, include: 
¾ They cover a very small proportion of the population (16% in South Africa at 
present) and have contributed to considerable inequities within the overall health 
system, whereby a small elite have access to extensive private health services 
and resources while the vast majority is dependent on under-resourced and over-
extended public health services (McIntyre and Doherty, 2004). 
¾ The number of medical schemes has grown dramatically which has fragmented 
the insured population into a large number of very small risk pools, which has 
raised concerns about the sustainability of this health insurance mechanism 
(McLeod, 2005). 
¾ There have been rapid increases in expenditure, particularly in relation to 
medicines, private hospital admissions and scheme administration activities, and 
hence in the contribution rates charged, by schemes.  There are various reasons 
why this has happened (e.g. as service providers are paid a fee for each service 
they provide, there is an incentive for them to ‘over-provide’), but the consequence 
is that medical scheme membership has become increasingly unaffordable 
(Doherty and McLeod, 2003, McIntyre and Doherty, 2004).  During much of the 
1980s and 1990s, contributions were increasing at rates far exceeding the general 
inflation rate while at the same time benefit packages were being reduced. As a 
consequence medical scheme members found they had to pay a considerable 
amount of money out of pocket for services that were not, or were only partially 
covered, by the scheme. 
¾ Limited tax resources are increasingly being devoted to supporting this expensive 
private insurance system.  This occurs in two ways.  Firstly, the tax deductibility of 
medical scheme contributions reduces government tax revenue considerably.  In 
South Africa, this was estimated to be over US$1 billion in 2001 (McLeod, 2005).  
In addition, these benefits are inequitably distributed, with higher income earners 
receiving a much greater share of the tax benefits. Secondly, the largest single 
employer in most African countries is the government, and a substantial amount of 
tax resources is devoted to purchasing medical scheme cover for civil servants.  
For example, the South African government spent 12 times more paying for 
medical scheme cover per civil servant than it spent on funding public sector 
health services per person dependent on these services in the early 2000s 
(McIntyre and Doherty, 2004).  This raises serious equity concerns about the use 
of limited tax funds. 
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South Africa is the country which has introduced the most extensive legislative and 
regulatory framework for private voluntary employment-based health insurance in an 
attempt to deal with some of these concerns.  Some of the key legislative and 
regulatory changes that have been introduced are: 
¾ Ensuring that contributions are community-rated and that no one who applies to a 
scheme can be refused membership on the basis of being high risk (although 
there are waiting periods before the member can start claiming benefits) (McLeod, 
2005). 
¾ Regulating that every scheme has to provide cover for a ‘prescribed minimum 
benefit package’. This package includes health services that could impose 
catastrophic costs on members and includes hospitalisation and all services for a 
wide range of chronic conditions, including AIDS (McLeod, 2005). 
¾ Reforming the tax benefits for medical scheme members.  In particular, it is 
proposed that a maximum cap be imposed on the tax benefit so that everyone 
contributing to a medical scheme would receive the same subsidy (of about 
US$50 per person per month) (National Treasury, 2005).  While this would 
promote a more equitable distribution of the tax benefit, there remain concerns 
about the amount of government resources being devoted to subsidising 
expensive private sector cover for a minority of the population (McIntyre et al., 
2005). 
 
Medical schemes themselves are introducing changes to their traditional way of 
operating in order to try to contain costs and to attract more members.  For example, 
they have implemented a number of American-style ‘managed care’ initiatives, such 
as insisting that members get permission from their schemes before being 
hospitalised with the scheme independently assessing the need for hospitalisation 
and setting limits on the number of days of admission, and using formularies of the 
drugs considered to be most cost-effective from which health care providers can 
prescribe and dispense (Doherty and McLeod, 2003).  Schemes are also negotiating 
special rates with certain providers.  In particular, some schemes are negotiating with 
public hospitals to provide care for their members in ‘private wards’.  While this can 
bring revenue into cash-strapped public hospitals, there are concerns about the 
equity implications for public hospitals. Current experience suggests that such 
mechanisms may end up sucking in resources from, rather than subsidising the care 
provided in, public wards, and creating a two tier system within hospitals (Wadee and 
Gilson, 2005).  
 
Further legislative and regulatory changes are envisaged (e.g. the introduction of a 
risk-equalisation mechanism – see explanation in section 4.4.1), but these are 
explicitly seen as a mechanism for moving away from private voluntary insurance to 
a social health insurance.  This reflects a growing consensus that in order to address 
some of the problems that have arisen with voluntary private insurance and to 
promote greater equity within the insured population as well as in the overall health 
system, moving towards some form of mandatory health insurance scheme is the 
most feasible option.  Mandatory insurance is discussed in detail in section 4.4.4. 
 
4.4.3 Community-based health insurance schemes 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes (also called mutual health 
insurance, mutual health organisations, community-based pre-payment, community 
health funds etc.) take many different forms.  They can broadly be defined as “any 
scheme managed and operated by an organization, other than a government or 
private for-profit company, that provides risk pooling to cover all or part of the costs of 
health care services” (Bennett, 2004) and generally include an element of community 
participation in their management or some form of democratic accountability of the 
management to the members.  Most frequently, these schemes provide cover for 
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those outside the formal employment sector and often serve rural communities.  
They may be linked with a particular health service provider (e.g. the scheme may 
only provide cover for services provided at the local hospital) or may cover services 
provided at a range of health facilities among which members can choose.  These 
schemes primarily developed as an alternative to user fees, i.e. instead of paying a 
fee at the time of using a health service, community members make small pre-
payments to the scheme which then cover the fee charged for the health services 
used. 
 
The majority of the oldest and largest CBHI schemes are to be found in Central and 
West Africa; the widespread development of such schemes in East and Southern 
Africa is a relatively new development.  Key features of some of the more well-known 
CBHI schemes in Africa are summarised in Appendix D. 
 
These schemes are becoming increasingly popular, with a very rapid growth in the 
number of schemes operating in African countries (Atim, 1998), many of which have 
been actively promoted by various international organisations (e.g. the World Bank 
provided financial and technical support for the establishment of the Tanzanian 
Community Health Fund).  The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
recommended that CBHI be increasingly used as a mechanism “to help cover the 
costs of community-based health delivery” in poor communities (World Health 
Organisation, 2001).  Similarly, the World Bank focuses almost exclusively on 
community insurance in its book on “Health Financing for Poor People” (Preker and 
Carrin, 2004).  There is a concern that some of these international organisations may 
view CBHI as the new ‘one size fits all answer’ to health care financing challenges in 
African countries.  It is also of concern that CBHI is being widely promoted despite 
the fact that, as noted by a recent extensive review of research on CBHI, “the 
evidence base is limited in scope and questionable in quality” (Ekman, 2004).  While 
there is a rapidly growing literature on these schemes, much of the research has 
focused on individual schemes and particularly on management capacity issues.  
Surprisingly little detailed research has been published that address questions such 
as ‘what works and what doesn’t work, why and in what context’. 
 
While there is clear evidence that these schemes may provide financial protection 
against unexpected health care costs for their members, and improve access to 
services when needed (Schneider and Diop, 2004), there are a number of concerns 
about this form of financing.  The primary concerns relating to CBHI include: 
¾ They generate a relatively limited amount of revenue, with one study finding that 
on average, about 25% or less of the costs of providing health services are 
recouped through CBHI contributions.  This is certainly significantly higher than 
cost recovery levels through user fees and is an important source of revenue for 
local health services.  Nevertheless, it highlights the fact that CBHI can never be 
more than a supplementary source of health care financing and that the majority 
of funding for health services in poor communities will need to continue to come 
from another source for the foreseeable future. 
¾ With very few exceptions, the level of population coverage by these schemes is 
relatively low.  Even well established schemes such as the CAM scheme in 
Burundi, the Babouantou scheme in Cameroon and the Nkoranza scheme in 
Ghana cover a quarter or less of the community or target population (Ekman, 
2004).  The Bwamanda scheme in DRC has a uniquely high coverage level of 
about 60% of the community (Criel et al., 1999). The majority of schemes have far 
lower coverage levels, such as 2.8% in one of the earliest Tanzanian Community 
Health Funds (Chee et al., 2002) and 6% in the Maliando scheme in Guinea (Criel 
and Waelkens, 2003). 
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¾ There is evidence that CBHI reaches “a large number of low-income populations 
who would otherwise have no financial protection against the cost of illness” 
(Jakab and Krishnan, 2004).  Nevertheless, such schemes that focus on rural 
communities or informal sector workers in urban areas do place a burden on those 
with the least ability to pay, and may end up being a mechanism whereby “the 
poor simply cross-subsidize the health care costs of other poor members of the 
population” (Bennett et al., 1998). There is also overwhelming evidence that the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups are excluded from these schemes (Ekman, 
2004, Jakab and Krishnan, 2004).  Affordability of even relatively low contributions 
has been shown to be a constraint to expanding coverage in some schemes (Criel 
and Waelkens, 2003). 
¾ A related issue is that the poorest community members will only be incorporated in 
these schemes if their membership contribution is partly or fully subsidised.  While 
there are some examples of contributions being subsidised either by the scheme 
itself (i.e. out of other members’ contributions) or by government or donors, 
considerable challenges are faced in identifying the most vulnerable households 
to benefit from these subsidies.  In addition, a mechanism for allocating 
government and/or donor funds equitably between schemes is needed, whereby 
greater amounts are allocated to communities with the highest poverty levels.  The 
equitable use of limited government and donor funds to support these schemes is 
a critical issue.  In some countries, such as in Tanzania for the Community Health 
Fund, government and donor funds are used to provide ‘matching grants’ 
according to the amount of revenue generated by each scheme.  While this is 
intended as an incentive for the scheme to register as many members and 
generate as much scheme contribution revenue as possible, it does mean that 
areas with lower poverty levels, which are likely to be able generate the largest 
contribution revenue, are generally able to secure the largest share of subsidies 
from government and donor funds, raising serious equity concerns.  There is 
growing debate about whether CBHI schemes are the most appropriate way to 
ensure access to health care for the vulnerable (this is touched on further in a 
later section). 
¾ Very little attention has been paid to how CBHI schemes link with other 
components of the health system (e.g. the impacts on non-members of schemes, 
linkages with direct government spending on services, impact of government 
subsidies to schemes, etc.) (Bennett, 2004).  Given that these schemes will 
always be only one component of health care financing within any particular 
country, it is important to explore how such schemes contribute to (or detract from) 
overall health system equity. 
 
There is a clear need for additional research to determine how to extend coverage of 
these schemes, how to ensure that the most vulnerable households are not excluded 
from the schemes and how these schemes could best contribute to an equitable 
health system.  Research documenting the experience of these schemes to date has 
highlighted some factors that can promote the successful implementation of these 
schemes.  These include: 
¾ Social factors were also found to influence enrolment levels. For example, Arhin 
(1995) suggested that ‘social cohesion’ is an important reason for the near 
universal participation in the Abota scheme in Guinea-Bissau. Other authors have 
noted the important role of community leaders in persuading community members 
to join and remain in schemes (Eklund and Stavem, 1996). 
¾ The affordability, frequency and timing of scheme contributions is an essential 
aspect of a successful scheme (Arhin, 1995, Eklund and Stavem, 1996, Shephard 
et al., 1996, Jakab and Krishnan, 2004, Shepard et al., 1996). Most successful 
rural schemes collect contributions once or twice a year, timed to coincide with 
harvests and sometimes allow payment in kind.  A sliding contribution scale, 
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rather than a single flat rate contribution, can promote affordability to households 
with a wider range of income levels (Bennett et al., 1998, Atim, 1998).  Another 
issue of importance is whether the contribution is made on a per person or per 
household basis, with those with a larger family size finding it difficult to cover all 
of their members if per person contributions are charged.  Many schemes are 
addressing this problem by using a graduated fee, where the fee per person 
declines as family size increases (e.g. a 4 person household may pay $1 per 
person, while a 6 person household may pay $0.80 per person) (Personal 
communication – Dr Chris Atim). 
¾ A related issue is the need for government support to ensure sustainability and 
equity in the scheme (Jakab and Krishnan, 2004), which may include creating the 
necessary legal framework for schemes and providing technical support (Bennett 
et al., 1998) as well as funding to subsidise members exempted from 
contributions. 
¾ Successful schemes have also instituted mechanisms to reduce the potential for 
adverse selection (i.e. the highest risk individuals with the greatest need for health 
services joining the scheme). In most cases, enrolment is only permitted at one 
time during the year, usually at the time of harvest when contributions are paid 
(Arhin, 1995, Shephard et al., 1996, Lambo, 1998). In contrast, schemes such as 
the CAM card scheme which permit enrolment at any time during the year, have 
been found to be subject to significant adverse selection (Arhin, 1994). Another 
mechanism for reducing adverse selection is to require family, as opposed to 
individual, membership (Lambo, 1998, Shephard et al., 1996, Atim, 1998). 
¾ The proximity of the health facility which will provide services covered by the 
scheme also influences willingness to pay scheme contributions (Arhin, 1995, 
Shephard et al., 1996). In addition, the perceived quality of services covered by 
the scheme is of critical importance (Arhin, 1994, Chabot et al., 1991, Criel and 
Waelkens, 2003). For example, Shaw and Griffin (1995) noted that the Bwamanda 
hospital was regarded as having a high quality of care (and achieved high 
coverage levels), but that the same did not apply in the CAM card scheme (which 
has relatively low coverage levels). Most community members cited drug 
shortages at health facilities as the major reason for not participating in the CAM 
card scheme (Arhin, 1994, Shaw and Griffin, 1995).  A related issue is the need to 
consult the target population when designing the scheme’s benefit package to 
determine their preferences and needs (Bennett et al., 1998). 
¾ There should be active purchasing of health services for scheme members so as 
to negotiate reasonable prices, ensure services in the benefit package are 
available and to monitor quality of care (Bennett et al., 1998, Jakab and Krishnan, 
2004). 
¾ Another characteristic of successful schemes is the existence of adequate 
capacity to manage funds (Eklund and Stavem, 1996). As contributions are 
usually made once or twice a year, it is important that funds be invested in interest 
bearing accounts (Shepard et al., 1996, Bennett et al., 1998, Shephard et al., 
1996). In addition, there should be a committed and accountable community-
based management committee (Jakab and Krishnan, 2004) that is trusted by the 
contributors (Schneider, 2005). 
 
There is also some evidence that the processes of implementation have important 
influences over the impact of such schemes (Goudge et al., 2003, Kamuzora, 2005). 
 
Although there is a need for further research and there are many challenges that 
need to be addressed if CBHI is to play a substantial role in equitable health 
systems, they are seen as an important way of providing some form of financial 
protection, to supplement general tax and donor resources, for those outside the 
formal employment sector.  A critical issue to make allowance for at an early stage is 
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how CBHI schemes are to be integrated into the overall health system, which 
includes considering a degree of consistency in their design (e.g. contribution levels 
and benefit packages).  While it is seen as important that each CBHI scheme is 
designed to meet the needs of the community within which it is located, this makes it 
difficult to integrate schemes into a coherent pre-payment system at a later stage 
(Bennett et al., 1998).  One country that has taken an interesting approach in this 
regard is Ghana, whose health insurance proposals are considered in the following 
section. 
 
4.4.4 Mandatory health insurance 
A few African countries have for some time had mandatory insurance systems that 
include health benefits, particularly in West Africa (e.g. Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Senegal) and to a lesser extent in East Africa (e.g. Burundi and Kenya) (Kutzin, 
1998).  However, such schemes cover no more than 5% to 10% of the employed 
population in SSA (Reynaud, 2002) and there is very little literature critically 
evaluating these schemes.  There has been limited interest in mandatory insurance 
exclusively for the health sector (as opposed to mandatory insurance for a 
comprehensive set of social security benefits) in the African region until very recently.  
A number of African countries have either recently introduced, or are seriously 
considering introducing, some form of mandatory health insurance (MHI).  This 
section provides a brief overview of these initiatives in four countries, namely: 
• Tanzania, which recently introduced a social health insurance scheme (SHI) (i.e. 
covering only certain groups); 
• South Africa, which has been debating and planning for the introduction of a SHI 
for over a decade; 
• Ghana, which has already begun introducing a national health insurance (NHI) 
scheme (i.e. covering the entire population); and 
• Kenya, which has developed detailed proposals for the introduction of a NHI. 
 
Tanzania 
In 1999, Tanzania enacted legislation to introduce mandatory health insurance for all 
civil servants and their dependents (spouse and up to 4 children or other legal 
dependents) (Government of Tanzania, 2001).  This ‘National Health Insurance 
Fund’ (NHIF) scheme was initiated on 1 July 2001, and initially only covered central 
government employees but was extended to all civil servants in 2002.  It has enrolled 
over 1.1 million beneficiaries to date, which is equivalent to approximately 3% of the 
Tanzanian population (Ministry of Health, 2005). 
 
Monthly contributions are equivalent to 6% of employees’ gross salary, half of which 
is paid by the employer and 3% by the employee. Contribution revenue is equivalent 
to approximately 6% of government spending on health services (Ministry of Health, 
2005).  The benefit package covers outpatient and inpatient services provided at 
accredited providers and drugs included on the essential drug list.  Services that are 
explicitly excluded from the package include: prosthetic appliances; attempted 
suicide related care; drug or alcohol abuse related illnesses; occupational injuries 
and diseases; circumcision and cosmetic surgery (Government of Tanzania, 2001).  
In terms of health facility accreditation, all public health facilities were automatically 
accredited in 2001.  Thereafter, certain mission and NGO facilities were accredited 
and finally, private-for-profit facilities are in the process of being accredited.  
Accredited providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis. 
 
It was always intended that mandatory health insurance coverage would be extended 
to formal sector employees of private firms.  This is about to be implemented under 
the auspices of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF).  This fund provides a 
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range of social security benefits and will now include a ‘Social Health Insurance 
Benefit’.  The design of the scheme is very similar to that for civil servants 
(contribution rate, benefit package etc.).  The main difference is that providers will be 
paid on a capitation rather than fee-for-service basis. 
 
Possibly the most surprising aspect to the development of mandatory insurance in 
Tanzania is the creation of separate insurance funds for civil servants and private 
sector employees.  This will reduce the extent of risk pooling that would be possible 
among formal sector employees and their dependents. 
 
South Africa 
The possibility of introducing a SHI has been under discussion in South Africa since 
the early 1990s.  Indeed, the African National Congress which came to power in the 
first democratic elections in 1994, incorporated explicit recommendations for a Social 
Health Insurance (SHI) in its National Health Plan (African National Congress, 1994) 
and the option of a SHI was further explored in two government established health 
care financing committees in 1994 and 1995.  These initial proposals were primarily 
seen as a mechanism for addressing the uncontrolled cost spiral in the private 
voluntary health insurance (termed medical schemes) and to address the inequitable 
public-private health system mix inherited from the apartheid era, i.e. to improve 
overall health system equity (McIntyre et al., 2003)6.  Instead of pursuing SHI in the 
mid-1990s, it was decided to attempt to address some of the problems with medical 
schemes through direct government regulation (see section 4.4.2).  This was seen as 
a critical preparatory phase to improve the efficiency of voluntary insurance before 
insurance coverage was made mandatory (McLeod, 2004). 
 
The future process for introducing SHI in South Africa is seen as involving three 
steps: 
• Improving risk-related (i.e. healthy to ill) cross-subsidies; 
• Ensuring income-related (i.e. high- to low-income) cross-subsidies; 
• Introducing mandatory cover (McLeod, 2004). 
 
The first step in the process, namely the introduction of a risk-equalisation 
mechanism, was approved by Cabinet in early 2005.  The risk-equalisation fund 
(REF) will effectively transfer resources from schemes which have a low-risk 
membership to those that have a relatively high-risk membership.  The risk factors 
that will be taken into account are: age of members in each scheme; a maternity 
delivery indicator; the number of people with specified chronic diseases in each 
scheme (both single and multiple chronic diseases); and the number of people in 
each scheme with HIV who are receiving anti-retroviral treatment (McLeod, 2004).  At 
present, data on each of these indicators is being collected from each scheme and 
the REF will be fully implemented by 2007. 
 
The second step of introducing income cross-subsidies is currently under discussion.  
It is envisaged that the current subsidy on medical scheme contributions, through tax 
deductibility of scheme contributions will be removed.  As indicated in section 4.4.2, 
higher income members of medical schemes receive a higher subsidy than lower 
income members.  In addition, and more concerning, the majority of medical scheme 
members receive a greater subsidy through this tax deduction than the government 
spends per person dependent on publicly provided health services (i.e. through 
general government expenditure on health services) (McIntyre et al., 2005).  The 
National Treasury (i.e. Ministry of Finance) is being lobbied to change the existing tax 
                                                 
6 McIntyre et al. (2003) provide a detailed overview of these early proposals and how they 
envisaged achieving these stated objectives. 
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deduction into a direct government expenditure subsidy.  It has been proposed that 
there should be an equal government subsidy per person.  In the case of those not 
covered by medical schemes, this would take the form of government expenditure on 
publicly provided health services.  For members of medical schemes, the subsidy 
would be paid into the REF and each member’s contribution level would be reduced 
by that amount (McLeod, 2004).  While the National Department of Health supports 
this approach, there is considerable resistance from National Treasury to its 
adoption.  It is envisaged that income cross-subsidies will be further strengthened 
when the SHI is introduced if a proportional or progressive contribution schedule is 
adopted (at present it is estimated that the SHI contribution will be in the region of 
4.5% of income). 
 
The final step in the process of introducing a SHI is that of mandating health 
insurance cover for selected groups.  At present, it is proposed that this focus on 
formal sector workers, and that it be initiated by mandating cover for civil servants in 
the first instance (as was done in Tanzania).  The plans for a mandatory Government 
Employee’s Medical Scheme (GEMS) is far advanced and is expected to be 
introduced in 2006.  In preparation for the extension of mandatory health insurance to 
all formal sector employees, a government established task team is currently 
undertaking detailed research into the requirements for schemes to provide efficient 
cover of the prescribed minimum benefit package for low-income earners, given that 
it is low-income employees who are not currently covered by voluntary medical 
schemes, but would be required to obtain insurance cover under a mandatory 
system. 
 
In summary, considerable research and planning has been undertaken in order to 
introduce a SHI in South Africa, and a number of crucial steps in the process towards 
this goal have been implemented while others are to be implemented in the next 2 
years.  Nevertheless, there remain conflicting views between the Department of 
Health and National Treasury on key issues which need to be resolved in SHI is to be 
implemented in a way that will promote risk- as well as income-related cross-
subsidies.  In addition, there remain concerns that a two tier health system could be 
entrenched by the planned SHI and that careful attention should be paid to how to 
promote cross-subsidies within the overall health system, rather than only within the 
insured group. 
 
Ghana 
The Ghanaian government has made the boldest moves in relation to introducing 
mandatory health insurance seen in any African country to date.  The stated 
motivation for introducing a NHI was to move away from the out-of-pocket payment 
system (called ‘cash and carry’ in Ghana) which was creating considerable equity 
concerns, largely due to non-functional exemption mechanisms (Nyonator and 
Kutzin, 1999), and towards a pre-payment system (Government of Ghana, 2003).  
The ‘National Health Insurance Act’ was passed in 2003 to operationalise this policy 
decision.  The Ghanaian NHI will essentially combine SHI for formal sector 
employees with community-based health insurance schemes for the informal sector 
in order to create the NHI.  The government is committed to universal coverage, but 
recognises that coverage will have to be gradually extended and the aim is to 
achieve enrolment levels of about 60% of residents in Ghana within 10 years of 
starting mandatory health insurance (Ministerial Task Team, 2002). 
 
The basis of the NHI system will be district-wide ‘Mutual Health Insurance Schemes’ 
(MHIS) in each district in Ghana.  The NHI Act explicitly requires every Ghanaian 
citizen to join either a MHIS or a private mutual or commercial insurance scheme 
(Government of Ghana, 2003).  However, government subsidies will only be provided 
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to MHIS, thus creating a strong incentive for people not to ‘opt out’ of the integrated 
NHI system by purchasing coverage through private insurance organisations.  Those 
employed in the formal sector will be covered through their payroll deducted 
contributions to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) Fund (see 
below).  Those outside the formal sector are expected to make direct contributions to 
their district MHIS, which are set at approximately $8 per adult per annum for the 
poor, $20 per annum for middle-income groups and $53 per annum for high-income 
groups (National Health Insurance Secretariat, 2004).  Each adult in a household is 
expected to become a MHIS member in their own right and pay the necessary 
contribution, which will cover themselves and dependent children under the age of 
18.  The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) will fully subsidise the contributions 
of the indigent. 
 
The NHIF will be funded mainly by a NHI levy of 2.5% sales tax on almost all goods 
and services, a 2.5% payroll deduction for formal sector employees as part of their 
contribution to the SSNIT Fund and government allocations (including both general 
tax revenue and donor funding).  The NHIF will allocate funds to each district MHIS in 
order to transfer the contributions of formal sector workers secured from the SSNIT 
payroll contributions, partially subsidise contributions for low-income households, 
fully subsidise contributions for the indigent and to serve a risk equalisation and 
reinsurance function.  Figure 4 attempts to illustrate how the flow of funds within the 
NHI would function.  It highlights that it is likely that a relatively high proportion of 
funds for MHIS in poor rural areas will be attributable to the NHIF given that they will 
have most of their members would require partially or fully subsidised membership. 
 
Figure 4: Flow of funds in Ghana NHI 
 
 
A relatively comprehensive benefit package is envisaged, including general and 
specialist consultations, a range of inpatient services as well as certain oral health, 
eye care and maternity services (Ministry of Health, 2004).  Services that are 
excluded include appliances and prostheses, cosmetic surgery, anti-retroviral 
treatment, fertility treatment, dialysis for chronic renal failure, organ transplants, 
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medicines not on the essential drug list (EDL) and VIP wards.  Services can be 
obtained from any accredited provider. 
 
A National Health Insurance Council (NHIC) is also being established.  It has wide-
ranging responsibilities including: Registering and regulating all insurance schemes; 
accrediting providers and monitoring their performance; educating the public in 
relation to health insurance issues; resolving complaints arising from insurance 
schemes, members or providers; developing policy proposals on health insurance for 
submission to the Minister of Health; and managing the NHIF (Government of 
Ghana, 2003). 
 
While many of the finer details of how the NHI will operate are still being resolved, 
Ghana is moving ahead with rapid implementation of this policy initiative.  A number 
of important issues in relation to the Ghanaian NHI development should be noted.  
Firstly, the NHI is seen largely as an alternative financing mechanism, rather than a 
source of substantial additional resources.  The government is anticipating devoting 
as much, if not more, tax revenue (and donor funds) to the health system.  These 
funds will simply be channelled in a different way with funds gradually being 
redirected from the current Ministry of Health budget allocation channels to NHIF 
allocation channels.  It is preferred to the current financing system because it will 
secure household contributions to health service funding (over and above tax 
payments) through pre-payment rather than out-of-pocket payment mechanisms.  In 
addition, it is anticipated that exemption of the indigent will be more effective under 
the NHI than under the current user fee system.  The main reason is that the indigent 
will be identified at community level in advance of needing to use a health service, in 
contrast to the current system of applying for an exemption at the health facility at the 
time of seeking care.  This process will have the added benefit that health care 
providers will not be able to identify who is financially contributing to the district MHIS 
and who is not (is fully subsidised), as all can be issued with identical insurance 
membership cards, which will minimise any service discrimination against the poor. 
 
Secondly, the NHI builds on the well-established tradition of community pre-payment 
schemes in Ghana.  There are several hundred of these schemes in Ghana, which 
has ensured that many Ghanaians are familiar with health insurance principles and 
the operation of MHIS.  However, the fate of existing community-based schemes was 
a major concern when the NHI was first announced.  The Act clarifies that existing 
community-based schemes may continue to operate independently, but will not 
receive a subsidy from the NHIF.  Attention has now turned to identifying ways of 
incorporating existing community-based schemes into the new district-wide MHIS 
(e.g. to serve as the sub-district office of the district MHIS). 
 
Finally, there is considerable government and donor support to promote successful 
implementation of the NHI.  The NHI was announced as an election promise and it is 
a promise that the government is committed to fulfilling.  While many donors were 
initially concerned about the feasibility of such a major and ambitious health care 
financing restructuring initiative, they have now also committed themselves to 
providing all possible support for its implementation. 
 
Kenya 
Kenya is one of the few African countries that already has some mandatory health 
insurance, which takes the form of the National Hospital Insurance Fund (developed 
in the late 1960s) which covers formal sector employees and their dependents 
(currently approximately 7 million people).  This fund only covers limited fees for 
inpatient hospital services (not at a cost-recovery level) and currently contributes only 
3.9% of resources for health care expenditure in Kenya (Ministry of Health, 2004). 
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The Ministry of Health in Kenya released proposals to establish a full NHI in May 
2004 for a NHI that was intended to be implemented on 1 July 2004 (Ministry of 
Health, 2004).  However, the proposals had not yet been implemented at the date of 
writing. 
 
The stated objective was similar to that in Ghana, namely to move away from out-of-
pocket to pre-payment for health services.  The policy statement on the NHI indicated 
that it would “ensure that every Kenyan pays small regular contributions to the 
National Social Health Insurance Fund before an illness occurs.  When illness 
occurs, Kenyans will not pay medical care at the time and point of treatment” 
(Ministry of Health, 2004). 
 
The proposed benefit package was not spelt out in detail, but was intended to include 
both outpatient and inpatient services at accredited facilities.  Funding would take the 
form of payroll contributions for those in the formal sector, contributions via 
community-based intermediaries (e.g. co-operatives, artisans associations, NGOs, 
churches etc.) to the National Social Health Insurance Fund for those outside the 
formal sector and government contributions on behalf of those unable to pay. 
 
Although limited details are available on the intended NHI in Kenya, the information 
that is available indicates that there are many similarities to the overall objectives and 
design of the Ghanaian NHI. 
 
Overall issues 
The above country case-studies highlight that there has been considerable interest in 
pursuing mandatory health insurance options in a number of African countries in 
recent years (late 1990s and early 2000s).  However, there are different objectives 
and different approaches to the design of these schemes across countries. 
 
On the one hand, some countries (e.g. Ghana and Kenya) are explicitly pursuing the 
introduction of mandatory insurance as a mechanism for moving away from user 
fees.  In both countries, policy documents announcing the proposed NHIs specifically 
mention that there is a concern about the adverse equity consequences of user fees 
and that they intend introducing pre-payment mechanisms to ensure that the 
population has access to health care when needed without the burden of paying out-
of-pocket at this time.  The insurance schemes will not only reduce the need to pay 
user fees, but could also reduce other out-of-pocket payments which are made to 
private providers.  This is so as the insured can use a range of providers if they have 
been accredited (on the basis of providing adequate quality of care and willingness to 
accept insurance scheme reimbursement rates).  Accreditation will include both 
public and private not-for-profit (e.g. mission facilities) facilities, given that in many 
countries mission facilities are the only providers in certain locations and in these 
instances are the designated district facility.  Private for-profit facilities could also be 
accredited if they are willing to charge the insurance company reasonable rates.  
Thus, the only out-of-pocket payments would relate to services outside of the benefit 
package, if any co-payments are introduced or if the accredited facility does not have 
the necessary drugs in stock.  As essential drug stock-outs is a pervasive problem in 
many public sector facilities in Africa, careful attention to improving drug 
procurement, distribution and stock control should be a major focus during insurance 
scheme implementation in order to ensure that out-of-pocket payments are reduced 
in reality. 
 
On the other hand, other countries (e.g. South Africa) are pursuing mandatory 
insurance as a means to addressing problems encountered with private voluntary 
insurance.  In South Africa (and in Tanzania), the intention is also to extend 
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insurance to a larger section of the population, so that people who are able to pay for 
health services but not necessarily at the time of using a service, can contribute via a 
pre-payment mechanism and hence reduce the burden on the public sector. 
 
There are also differences in terms of preferring a SHI or a NHI from the outset.  A 
point worth noting is that both countries that cited reducing the burden of out-of-
pocket payments as the major motivation for introducing mandatory insurance 
decided to implement a universal or national health insurance system.  In countries 
which have opted for a SHI, those who are not (or will not be) covered under this 
mandatory insurance either have to pay out-of-pocket when they use a health 
services (as in South Africa) or have a choice between joining a community pre-
payment scheme or paying out-of-pocket (as in Tanzania).  This highlights that the 
choice between a NHI and a SHI is very closely linked to the policy objective for 
mandatory insurance (i.e. whether the emphasis is on to move away from out-of-
pocket payments or simply extending insurance coverage). 
 
For countries that have chosen to go the SHI route, there are two important 
concerns.  Firstly, it entrenches a two tier health system.  While most countries intend 
to ultimately move towards a NHI with SHI being the first step, a deep divide between 
the insured, who have excellent access to a wide range of high quality health 
services, and the uninsured who often are consigned to under-resourced and poor 
quality public sector services for the poor, will remain for many decades.  The second 
concern is that in many instances, the first group to be covered by mandatory health 
insurance are civil servants.  In many ways this is a sensible approach as civil 
servants are often the single largest group of formal sector employees in African 
countries.  However, it must be recognised that limited government funds will be 
used to purchase mandatory insurance cover for this group. Thus, while the stated 
goal may be to reduce the burden on public services, the cost of insuring civil 
servants may exceed the resources ‘released’ by this group through reduced use of 
public sector services without cost-recovery payments (Kutzin, 1998).  In this way, 
there may in fact be fewer government resources available for providing services for 
those who are dependent on publicly-funded services, hence the observation that the 
uninsured will only have access to under-resourced, poor quality public sector 
services. 
 
For countries that have opted for NHI from an early stage, there are certain benefits 
but also considerable challenges.  The major benefit from an equity perspective is 
that there is the political intention to achieve universal coverage in an integrated 
health system from the outset in the shortest possible period.  Explicit mechanisms to 
include those within the formal sector and those outside it are introduced from the 
outset.  Another benefit is that it is easier from an implementation perspective to 
introduce mandatory insurance with a common benefit package and contribution 
schedule from the outset rather than allowing the fragmented development of 
voluntary insurance schemes with a wide range of benefit packages and contribution 
schedules and trying to integrate them at a later stage.  Indeed, this is one of the 
challenges facing Ghana as there is resistance from existing community-based pre-
payment schemes as they need to restructure their contributions and benefit 
packages in order to participate in the mandatory scheme.  A key challenge with 
embarking on a NHI from the outset of introducing mandatory insurance is that of 
sustainability.  Considerable administrative, financial management and actuarial 
capacity is needed in order for the NHI to succeed.  In addition, in the context of a 
small formal sector, with those outside the formal sector only able to make limited 
financial contributions, and high poverty levels, there are serious concerns about the 
financial viability and sustainability of the NHI scheme.  Clearly substantial 
government (and donor) funding is needed, but there is uncertainty about whether 
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these resources will be adequate to cope with the increased utilisation of health 
services that will inevitably arise when financial barriers to accessing services are 
removed. 
 
Given that these mandatory health insurance initiatives have only been introduced 
very recently, there are many questions about the advantages and disadvantages of 
different approaches within the African context that will remain unanswered for some 
time to come.  The issue of mandatory health insurance is one that requires 
extensive additional research and careful planning, monitoring and evaluation of its 
implementation in countries which have recently, or are about to, introduce this form 
of insurance. 
 
 
4.5 Overall health care financing issues 
As is evident from the above review, no country has a single source of financing for 
health care services.  Instead, a combination of alternative financing mechanisms is 
drawn on to fund the overall health system.  Even if the main financing mechanism is 
a universal mandatory health insurance scheme, there are a number of different 
sources of funding for this scheme (e.g. payroll deductions for formal sector workers, 
direct pre-payment contributions by the non-poor population outside the formal 
sector, general tax revenue and donor funding).  Each financing mechanism could 
potentially have negative effects on equity or may enhance equity, depending on how 
it is structured and the context within it is operating.  A key challenge facing 
governments in Africa (and indeed worldwide) is how to adapt this combination or 
package to strengthen existing financing mechanisms. 
 
A starting point in this regard could be to undertake research to identify who bears 
the burden of contributing to (financing incidence) and who benefits from (benefit 
incidence) each financing mechanism and to what extent, and to assess the overall 
incidence (financing and benefit) within a country.  This will enable policy-makers to 
identify how each mechanism is contributing, or creating obstacles, to equitable 
health system financing.  A detailed illustration of how one would assess financing 
and benefit incidence and the overall equity of a health system with a range of health 
care financing mechanisms is provided in Appendix A (this information has been 
placed in an appendix so as not to interrupt the overall flow of argument, not because 
it isn’t important and interesting; it’s worth reading!). 
 
Once there is a good understanding of the financing and benefit incidence of each 
financing mechanism, it is possible to assess what needs to be done to address any 
existing inequities or to further enhance equity.  Table 4 provides an overview of 
some of the key issues that need to be addressed in order to promote equity in the 
distribution of the burden of paying for health care and of the benefits from services 
for each financing mechanism. 
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Table 4: Equity promotion strategies according to financing mechanism 
Financing 
mechanism 
Promoting equitable distribution of 
financing burden 
Promoting equitable distribution 
of service benefits 
General tax 
revenue 
• Progressively structured personal 
income tax 
• Reasonably substantial company 
income tax component 
• Low proportion of general tax revenue 
contributed by VAT 
• Good tax compliance and efficient 
revenue collection 
• Allocate government funds for 
health services according to 
relative need of the population 
• Higher income groups using 
public sector services should 
contribute to cost (preferably 
through insurance) 
• Ensuring ‘paying’ patients do not 
‘crowd out’ the poor 
Donor funding 
• Mainly in the form of grants rather than 
loans 
• Avoid macroeconomic policy conditions 
that could exacerbate poverty or 
inequitable income distribution 
• Use of donor funds in line with 
national health policy priorities 
(preferably through domestic 
government-led decision-making 
process) 
Mandatory health 
insurance 
• Progressive, or as a minimum 
proportional, contribution structure; 
avoid flat rate contributions 
• Partially subsidised contributions for 
low-income and fully subsidised 
contributions for poor in universal NHI 
• Ensure employer contributions for civil 
servants does not exceed government 
resources ‘released’ through reduced 
use of heavily subsidised public sector 
services 
• Use risk-equalisation mechanism if a 
number of schemes involved (ensure 
higher risk, usually vulnerable, groups 
don’t pay more) 
• Improve geographic distribution 
of services to ensure equitable 
access to benefit package (real 
access not just entitlement) 
• Avoid or minimise co-payments 
(influence use by members 
through other means, e.g. PHC 
gatekeepers) 
• Risk-equalisation to ensure each 
scheme has adequate resources 
to meet needs of members, 
given its risk profile 
Private voluntary 
employment-
based insurance 
• Income-related rather than flat rate 
contributions 
• Avoid high levels of tax subsidies to 
private insurance members 
• Avoid or minimise co-payments 
Community-
based health 
insurance 
• Income-related sliding scale for 
contributions; not single rate 
• Adjust contributions for family size 
• Subsidise contributions for low income 
if feasible 
• Avoid or minimise co-payments 
• Design package to meet needs 
of community served 
Out-of-pocket 
payments 
• Minimise reliance on this source of 
funding 
• Exempt the poor and other vulnerable 
groups 
• Encourage private providers to 
introduce price discrimination in their 
practices (higher fees for the rich to 
subsidise lower fees for the poor) 
• Exempt the poor and other 
vulnerable groups 
 
It is not only important to consider the equity of each financing mechanism, but also 
overall health system equity when all financing mechanisms are considered together.  
In many African countries, these financing mechanisms are extremely fragmented 
and there are limited cross-subsidies in the overall health system.  For example, if a 
country has voluntary health insurance whether in the form of private employment-
based insurance or community-based health insurance, there are usually a large 
number of these schemes that operate completely independently of each other.  If 
there is also a heavy reliance on out-of-pocket payments, cross-subsidies between 
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the rich and the poor and from the healthy to the ill will virtually be non-existent.  
There will probably only be a small element of risk (healthy to ill) cross-subsidy within 
each voluntary insurance scheme, but none between individual schemes nor 
between individuals paying out-of-pocket, and there will be no income (wealthy to 
poor) cross-subsidy, unless there was a progressively structured insurance 
contribution scale.  This fragmentation and lack of cross-subsidies adversely impacts 
not only on health system equity but also on efficiency and sustainability.  For 
example, if there are a large number of small insurance schemes, each will have a 
very small risk pool, as a result of which they frequently experience sustainability 
problems.  Thus, a key challenge is to find mechanisms for reducing fragmentation 
and facilitating linkages and cross-subsidies between the different financing 
mechanisms. 
 
The existence of a range of alternative financing mechanisms also has implications 
for the equitable allocation of government resources (and donor funds if these are 
pooled with tax funding through SWAps or general budget support). This is 
highlighted in Figure 5 which compares the possible situation in a rural and urban 
area. 
 
 
 
The bars represent the level of funding from alternative sources on a per capita 
basis.  The bottom block in each bar indicates that government has allocated its 
resources on an equal per capita basis. The next bar indicates that more user fee 
revenue is generated in the urban district than in the rural one, due to greater ability 
to pay amongst urban dwellers working in the formal or informal sectors.  The same 
applies to community-based health insurance (CBHI) contributions.  Assuming 
government matches CBHI contributions on a ‘dollar for dollar’ basis, this again 
preferentially benefits the urban district.  The block that is second from the top of the 
right-hand bar (and top of the left-hand bar) represents donor program funds that are 
at present likely to be heavily concentrated in urban areas.  For example, Global 
Figure 5: 
Equitable access to public facilities: Seeing all the  
pieces of the puzzle 
Mandatory insurance 
reimbursements 
Global Fund ARV  
Tax & Donor pooled 
OOP user fee revenue 
CBHI contributions 
Matching govt. grant 
Rural district Urban district 
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Fund resources for the provision of ARVs are likely to flow largely to urban areas, at 
least in the initial stages of the ARV roll-out, given that it will be far easier to provide 
these services to urban residents. Finally, the top block of the right-hand bar 
represents revenue that public sector facilities, particularly hospitals, may generate in 
the form of mandatory health insurance reimbursements when their members use 
these facilities.  Given that mandatory insurance members will be heavily 
concentrated in urban areas, such funds may not even accrue to rural facilities. 
 
This illustrates how significant inequities in the allocation of health care resources 
may arise, even when government allocates its tax resources on an equal per capita 
basis.  It raises the importance of taking a comprehensive view to the health system 
and to consider the equity of each financing mechanism and the impact of each 
mechanism on equitable financing in the overall health system.  Further, government 
allocations are a critical way of offsetting disparities arising from other health care 
financing mechanisms and these disparities should explicitly be taken into account 
when allocating government (and pooled donor funds) across geographical areas. 
 
A final issue that requires consideration is that of mechanisms (e.g. exemptions) for 
protecting the poor and other vulnerable groups.  Such mechanisms would not be 
required if the health system was entirely funded by tax (and pooled donor grant) 
funding, i.e. if no one had to contribute to a health insurance scheme or make any 
out-of-pocket payments.  It is already well recognised that exemptions are required 
within a user fee system.  There has been a more recent recognition that there may 
be a need to accurately identify the poor in order to subsidise health insurance 
membership for them, where the emphasis is placed on pre-payment rather than out-
of-pocket payment financing mechanisms.  However, there has been very little 
detailed consideration of whether including the poor in health insurance schemes is 
the most appropriate way of ensuring their access to health services.  On the one 
hand, given the relative lack of experience of health insurance within the African 
context, it is questionable whether the service access fate of the most vulnerable 
groups in society should be placed in the hands of largely unproven institutions.  On 
the other hand, if insurance becomes a dominant health care financing mechanism, 
not including the poor may simply create a two tier system.  Another mechanism that 
has recently been used to ensure that the lowest-income groups benefit from tax 
funds is to issue them with vouchers which they can present at health facilities in 
return for specified services (Ensor, 2004).  Facilities then present these vouchers to 
the local health department who reimburses the cost out of general tax funded 
budgets.  Whatever is finally decided in specific countries, it will be necessary to 
identify the poor in order that adequate resources can be directed (whether through 
traditional government budget channels or into special funds to cover voucher 
reimbursements, or fee or insurance contribution exemptions) to secure health care 
access for the poor. 
 
It is not necessary to provide detailed information on alternative ways to design 
exemption mechanisms as others have provided extensive reviews of these issues 
(Bitrán and Giedion, 2003, Newbrander et al., 2000).  However, it is necessary to 
highlight the fact that exemption mechanisms which target specific demographic 
groups (e.g. the elderly, children under a specified age and pregnant women) and 
health services regarded as a priority (e.g. ante-natal care, immunisations) are most 
frequently used, not least of all because of the greater ease in identifying the 
intended beneficiaries.  Without exception, health service providers in countries 
around the world find it most difficult to accurately identify and protect the poor.  
Means testing is time-consuming, resource intensive and frequently inaccurate if 
undertaken at the time of use of health services. 
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There is clearly an urgent need to develop effective mechanisms for identifying and 
protecting the poor.  While there is no ‘ideal’ system to use as a model, the key 
elements of such a mechanism would include: 
• Identification of the poor should occur in advance of the need to use a health 
service (i.e. should not be left to health service providers to undertake when a 
patient presents at a facility).  There are a number of reasons for this including: 
difficulty in accurately determining a person’s socio-economic status as the 
provider has no knowledge or evidence of their status; and a poor person may 
not incur transport costs (financial or time lost to work) to seek care if they are not 
certain that they will be exempted. 
• Instead, identification of the poor should be done at community level at a 
specified time and the person/household issued with some form of card or 
certificate.  The key problem with this approach is that it could stigmatise those 
with these cards or certificates and they may be discriminated against in the 
quality of care they receive.  In the case of identification for purposes of granting 
subsidised health insurance membership, this can be avoided as the poor can be 
issued with identical cards to those who are contributing financially to the 
insurance scheme. 
• Verifiable proxy indicators of poverty or vulnerability, that are appropriate to the 
specific community, should be identified.  These may take the form of asset 
ownership (e.g. livestock), housing conditions, access to essential services (e.g. 
potable water and sanitation), etc.  Clearly these indicators would be different in 
rural and urban areas. 
• Careful attention should be paid to who should undertake the identification 
process.  It may be appropriate for a staff member of a social welfare or poverty 
alleviation office to assume this responsibility (in fact, the health sector may be 
able to ‘piggy-back’ onto existing identification procedures undertaken for other 
social sectors).  It is also important to get community level input to the process, 
as it is community members who are most familiar with the socio-economic 
circumstances of neighbouring households.  However, previous experience has 
shown that the process can be open to abuse if left entirely to an individual 
community leader. 
• The process of implementation should be monitored and evaluated to identify 
problems and address them. 
 
 
5. Implications for policy, advocacy and research 
The review above highlights that: 
¾ Out-of-pocket payments are the single largest source of health care finance in 
many African countries and impose a very heavy burden on households, 
particularly the poorest; 
¾ There is still a relatively heavy reliance on donor funding, but this source of 
finance can be unreliable; 
¾ General tax funding is a critical component of the health care financing in all 
African health systems, but the ability to dramatically increase allocations from this 
source to the health sector in the short-term remain constrained, particularly given 
the equally urgent need for additional tax funding for other social sectors (noting 
that many of the activities in these sectors indirectly contribute to improved health 
status); 
¾ Health insurance, both voluntary and mandatory, is quite limited at present but 
there is considerable and rapidly growing interest in expanding this financing 
mechanism. 
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Enormous constraints and challenges face African countries in relation to health care 
financing.  From the perspective of pursuing financing strategies that will promote 
equity and alleviate poverty, rather than contribute to further impoverishment of 
vulnerable households, the following principles to guide consideration of alternative 
financing mechanisms within individual country contexts are suggested: 
¾ The mechanism(s) should provide financial protection, i.e. should ensure that no 
one who needs health services is denied access due to inability to pay and 
households’ livelihoods should not be threatened due to the costs of accessing 
health care. This implies that health care financing contributions or payments 
should be separated from service utilisation, which requires some form of pre-
payment. 
¾ Health care financing contributions should be distributed according to ability-to-
pay.  In particular, progressive health care financing mechanisms (i.e. where those 
with greater ability-to-pay contribute a higher proportion of their income than those 
with lower incomes) should be prioritised (see further discussion below). 
¾ Cross-subsidies (from the healthy to the ill and from the wealthy to the poor) in the 
overall health system should be promoted.  This implies that fragmentation 
between and within individual financing mechanisms should be reduced and that 
mechanisms should be put in place to allow cross-subsidies across all financing 
mechanisms. 
¾ Mechanisms to ensure that financial resources are translated into universal 
access to health services should be put in place.  This implies that all individuals 
should be entitled to benefit from health services via one of the funding 
mechanisms in place, the package of benefits to which they are entitled is explicit 
(so that individuals are aware of their entitlements to enhance their claims on 
these entitlements), there is active purchasing of services whereby ‘value for 
money’ is secured (both in terms of efficiency and quality), and there is adequate 
physical access to services to which one is entitled. 
 
Many of these principles are in line with those proposed by WHO in relation to what 
constitutes ‘fair financing’ within health systems (World Health Organisation, 2000).  
The main area in which we differ from the WHO’s interpretation of fair financing is 
that we propose that progressive financing as opposed to proportional financing 
mechanisms should be pursued.  The WHO clearly stated that it favoured 
proportional systems, where every individual contributes the same proportion of 
her/his income towards health care.  As has been noted by others, this preference for 
proportional funding implicitly views regressive funding (where the poorest contribute 
a higher proportion of their income than the rich) and progressive funding as equally 
unfair (Wagstaff, 2000).  The international health care financing literature and 
national health policy statements overwhelmingly support the notion of progressive 
funding as being the fairest approach.  In the African context, with high existing 
poverty levels and a continual process of further impoverishment due to illness-
related costs, we have no hesitation in supporting a preference for progressive health 
care financing mechanisms. 
 
From a practical perspective, the above principles suggest the following actions in 
relation to health care financing within the African context: 
¾ Explicit commitments by African governments to move away from out-of-pocket 
funding mechanisms for public sector health services, and actively pursuing 
alternative financing mechanisms to make this a reality. 
¾ Urgent efforts to increase the health sector’s share of government resources in 
line with the existing commitment of African Heads of States in Abuja to a 15% 
share for health.  This should not be done at the expense of other social services, 
recognising that these services also contribute to improving the health status of 
the population.  These decisions should occur within the context of more open, 
 44
public debate about the relative priorities for the use of limited government 
resources. 
¾ In order for this to be achieved, there should be unconditional cancellation of 
African governments’ external debt, to allow governments to devote limited tax 
revenue to health care to achieve the Abuja goal, rather than to debt servicing and 
repayment.  There should also be other efforts to increase domestic tax resources 
that do not necessarily require increases in personal income tax rates, such as 
improved tax collection procedures and levying appropriate corporate and wealth 
taxes (particularly on international corporations currently extracting considerable 
profits from their activities in African countries). 
¾ As general tax funding and health insurance options are most closely aligned with 
the above principles, introducing or expanding insurance mechanisms should be 
given serious consideration to supplement limited tax resources.  There is an 
urgent need for additional research into appropriate health insurance within the 
African context, and much can be learnt from monitoring and evaluating the 
experience of countries which are already moving ahead with implementing 
mandatory insurance.  There should also be more sharing of experiences with 
insurance across the region and increased policy dialogue about these options.  
There may also be value in other countries piloting and gradually introducing 
health insurance schemes, but only once a careful feasibility assessment has 
been undertaken. 
¾ Active management of donor funding, to ensure that national Ministries of Health 
lead and control decisions on the use of these funds to ensure that they contribute 
to achieving national health priorities. 
¾ Equitable allocation of funds that are mobilised through the above strategies, to 
ensure that all citizens of African countries have access to health services 
irrespective of whether they reside in a rural or urban area. 
 
The available experience also stresses the importance of carefully planning the 
implementation of any of new financing policy developments. The experience of 
removing user fees discussed earlier clearly demonstrates the importance of 
planning implementation processes (Gilson and McIntyre, 2005). Broader experience 
of financing policy implementation suggests that the range of strategies that can 
support implementation include ensuring that the views of beneficiaries are taken into 
consideration when designing new policies, gaining support from the health staff 
responsible for implementation, and ensuring monitoring and evaluation systems that 
do not simply measure progress towards targets, but rather represent ‘early learning’ 
mechanisms that allow the process, as much as the design, of interventions to be 
adapted as implementation proceeds (Gilson et al., 1999, Goudge et al., 2003). 
 
Finally, the review presented here highlights a number of areas that should receive 
priority in future research: 
¾ It is important to gain a better understanding of who contributes to and benefits 
from each financing mechanism and to what extent, and how this impacts on 
overall health system equity (i.e. to assess the distribution of financing burdens 
and service benefits across the whole package of health care financing 
mechanisms in a country).  While there is growing evidence in this regard for high-
income countries and in some middle-income countries, there is extremely limited 
empirical evidence within the African context.  For example, it is not known 
whether indirect taxes or voluntary health insurance contributions are currently 
progressive or regressive in different countries on the continent.  More importantly, 
evidence on the equity impact of the mix of health care financing mechanisms in 
African countries is virtually non-existent. 
¾ International evidence overwhelmingly indicates that health care systems that are 
predominantly tax funded are the most equitable.  Further research is needed in 
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the African context to identify ways of increasing and sustaining tax revenue 
allocations for health services.  Research is also required to assess whether it is 
feasible to achieve universal health systems that are largely tax funded in the 
African context, given that the percentage contribution of tax revenue to total 
health care expenditure is currently very low.  Research should, thus, also 
consider other feasible mechanisms (e.g. combinations of general tax and 
mandatory insurance funding) for moving towards universal and equitable health 
systems. 
¾ Critical evaluation of the full range of health insurance options in the African 
context is possibly the greatest priority for future health care financing research if 
we are to ensure that health insurance developments promote rather than 
undermine health system equity in Africa.  It is necessary to create a solid 
evidence base, for example to identify effective strategies for achieving high 
coverage levels, equitable yet easily administered contribution scales, sustainable 
benefit packages, addressing moral hazard, etc. 
¾ There is an urgent need to investigate effective mechanisms for identifying the 
poor and other vulnerable groups.  Mechanisms for exempting the poor from user 
fees have been difficult to implement and relatively unsuccessful in most cases.  
Even if there is movement away from this form of financing in favour of health 
insurance mechanisms to supplement tax funding, it will be necessary to protect 
poor and other vulnerable households by either fully or partially subsidising 
membership of these schemes or ensuring appropriate access to tax funded 
health services if we are to progress to universal and equitable health systems.  It 
is thus essential to explore the most effective mechanisms for identifying and 
providing financial protection for the poor, including critically evaluating 
mechanisms for targeting individuals compared with other targeting mechanisms 
(e.g. geographic targeting). 
¾ Better understanding of how to manage processes of policy development and 
implementation to support the achievement of objectives, and to guard against 
possible opposition and resistance to new policies. 
 
In addition to the abovementioned research, there needs to be more dissemination of 
evidence, exchange of information on promising practice and policy dialogue to 
provide and use a good evidence base to promote the design and implementation of 
equitable health care financing systems.  EQUINET plans to initiate a program of 
research, information dissemination, policy dialogue and support of policy processes 
to contribute to the development and uptake of this evidence base. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED ILLUSTRATION OF FINANCING AND BENEFIT 
INCIDENCE INTERACTIONS 
 
The series of three figures below attempts to illustrate what the financing, benefit and 
overall incidence may be in a particular country.  It should be noted that these are 
merely illustrative; the graphs are unlikely to be straight lines and more likely to be 
curved in reality, and the line for a particular financing mechanism may be upward 
sloping in some contexts but downward sloping in others. 
 
The first figure illustrates financing incidence by comparing the percentage of total 
income that is contributed to a particular health care financing mechanism across 
income groups (note that the vertical axis does not extend from 0% to 100%, but 
merely represents relatively low and high levels of contributions as a percentage of 
household income).  In this example, the following issues are highlighted: 
• Personal income tax is progressively structured, i.e. higher income groups 
contribute a higher percentage of their income towards this tax than lower income 
groups (and the line is upward sloping).  There are some very low income groups 
that do not pay any income tax. 
• Value Added Tax (VAT) is represented as being regressive, as lower income 
groups pay a higher percentage of their income towards VAT in this example (the 
line is downward sloping).  As was mentioned previously, VAT may be 
progressive in some countries with a substantial informal sector (particularly in 
relation to the sale of fresh foodstuffs).  It should be noted that every person 
contributes something to VAT. 
• Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments are also represented as being regressive in this 
example (there are very few instances where OOP payments are not regressive).  
Again, it is assumed that everyone makes some OOP payments for health 
services; for the lowest income groups, this is likely to take the form of user fees 
at public sector facilities or purchasing occasional medicines from an informal 
drug seller or a traditional healer and for high income groups this may take the 
form of co-payments required by their insurance scheme or payments for 
services not covered by the insurance benefit package. 
• Voluntary insurance contributions are represented as being regressive.  This will 
occur when a flat rate or a risk-rated contribution is charged (given that lower 
income groups tend to have a greater risk of ill-health).  Again, only part of the 
population contributes to such schemes, with middle- and high-income groups 
being the most likely to purchase voluntary insurance (particularly in the case of 
private voluntary insurance, but the lowest income groups are also likely not to ce 
covered even in community pre-payment schemes). 
• Mandatory insurance is represented here as being progressive, which would 
occur if contribution rates increase with income.  Frequently these contributions 
would be proportional (i.e. each person contributes the same percentage of their 
income to the mandatory insurance) which would result in a flat horizontal line, 
but may be regressive if there is a flat rate contribution (i.e. each person pays the 
same monetary amount, which translates into a higher percentage of income for 
lower income groups than higher income groups).  In this example, it is assumed 
that not everyone contributes to the mandatory insurance.  This would occur 
either when there is a SHI or where everyone is a member but the lowest income 
groups do not have to contribute themselves.  In either case, the number of 
people contributing to this form of insurance is greater than in the case of 
voluntary insurance. 
• This example indicates that the health care financing mechanisms are 
progressive overall.  The incidence of all financing mechanisms combined is 
dependent on the percentage share of each mechanism to total health care 
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financing and the extent to which each mechanism is itself progressive or 
regressive.  In this example, the progressive overall financing incidence implies 
that a relatively high proportion of health care resources are attributable to 
mandatory insurance and general tax revenue, and that personal income tax is 
the major source of general tax revenue.  The overall financing incidence would 
be regressive (and the line would be downward sloping) if OOP payments were a 
major source of health care financing (as is the case in many African countries) 
and if VAT contributes a substantial amount of general tax revenue. 
 
Donor funding is not included in the figure below.  In the case of donor grants, the 
incidence falls on residents of the donor countries; although these funds will 
potentially ease the burden of health care financing on individual households within 
the recipient country, this impact cannot be directly measured.  In the case of donor 
loans, the loans and interest repayments will have to be repaid from tax funds over 
an extended period and will thus have a similar financing incidence to the existing tax 
structure. 
 
 
 
The next figure illustrates benefit incidence by comparing who benefits from health 
services across income groups.  The vertical axis in this figure is different to that in 
the financing incidence figure; here it tries to reflect the extent to which an individual 
actually benefits from (or accesses and uses) a health service.  In benefit incidence 
studies, this is expressed in monetary terms as the total cost of the services used.  If 
one bears in mind that the lowest income groups tend to have the greatest need for 
health services, a downward sloping curve would be equitable as those with the 
greatest need (lowest income) are deriving a greater benefit.  In this example, the 
following issues are highlighted: 
• Tax funded health services are used more by lower income groups than high 
income groups and in this case the poor benefit most from these services.  As 
indicated previously, there are a number of examples of African countries where 
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this does not occur, for example where the poor are only able to access very 
limited public services at the primary care level while high- and middle-income 
groups access expensive urban-based public hospitals and do not pay (or pay 
very little) for such care. 
• In this example, the rich benefit more from OOP payments.  The major reason for 
this is that the lowest income groups are only able to use services funded by this 
means very infrequently and hence derive relatively less benefit than higher 
income groups. This may seem contradictory when one compares the financing 
and benefit incidence curves for OOP payments because in the case of OOP 
payments, you ‘get what you pay for’.  However, while the poor pay a higher 
percentage of their incomes in OOP payments than the rich, the actual monetary 
amount of these payments is lower for the poor than for the rich.  For example, a 
$1 payment by a person with a monthly income of $10 is 10% of their income, 
while a $5 payment by a person with a monthly income of $500 is 1% of their 
income. 
• In the case of voluntary insurance, the rich are represented here as deriving 
greater benefit.  This will occur when lower-middle income groups belong to 
insurance schemes that offer a very limited benefit package while higher income 
groups are able to purchase the most comprehensive packages.  Also, if co-
payments are required, higher income groups are more able to make these 
payments and hence use services subject to a co-payment than lower income 
groups.  This pattern may not occur if the voluntary insurance system has a good 
mechanism for ensuring risk (healthy to ill) cross-subsidies within the insured 
population.  It should be noted that only those who contributed to voluntary 
insurance derive any benefits from this source of funding. 
 
 
 
• Services available under mandatory insurance are represented here as benefiting 
lower income groups more than higher income groups.  This is likely to occur with 
the increased likelihood of appropriate risk (healthy to ill) cross-subsidies existing 
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in a mandatory than a voluntary health insurance environment.  Once again, only 
those who contribute to this insurance system benefit from it (i.e. in this case, it 
represents a SHI). 
• In this example, overall benefits from health services, when combined for all 
financing mechanisms, are greater for higher than lower income groups.  As with 
financing incidence, the overall benefit incidence is dependent on the percentage 
share of benefits secured through each financing mechanism and the extent to 
which each financing mechanism provides access to service benefits when 
needed. 
 
Once again, donor funding is not included in the benefit incidence figure.  Donor 
funding, if directed to services which are needed by the local population and which 
can be easily accessed, could have a positive impact on benefit incidence.  Equally, 
it could have a negative impact if these funds are directed to services which are 
perceived as priorities by donors but which do not meet the needs of the local 
population. 
 
The final figure combines the overall financing and benefit incidence curves.  At first 
glance, it appears that the health system described in this example is equitable: The 
overall burden of health care financing is progressive; the rich are contributing a 
greater share of their income than the poor.  In addition, lower-income groups are 
obtaining greater benefit from the health system than they are contributing in financial 
terms.  However, it should be borne in mind that lower income groups tend to bear a 
greater burden of ill-health and thus have a greater need for health services than the 
rich.  From an equity perspective, benefit should be distributed according to need 
rather than according to ability to pay or according to the actual financial amount 
contributed.  Thus, in an equitable health system, we would expect a downward 
sloping overall benefit curve. 
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APPENDIX B: KEY HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND MACROECONOMIC DATA FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Country 
Total 
expenditure on 
health as % of 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
Government 
expenditure on 
health as % of 
total 
government 
expenditure   
Government 
expenditure on 
health as % of 
total 
expenditure on 
health 
Private 
expenditure on 
health as % of 
total 
expenditure on 
health  
External 
resources for 
health as % of 
total 
expenditure on 
health  
Social security 
expenditure on 
health as % of 
government 
expenditure on 
health 
Private Prepaid 
plans as % of 
private 
expenditure on 
health 
Out-of-Pocket 
expenditure as 
% of private 
expenditure on 
health 
GDP per 
Capita,2000, 
current 
prices,USD 
Angola 5 4.1 41.9 58.1 7.9 0 0 100 
  
665 
Benin 4.7 11.1 44.4 55.6 65.9 n/a 9 90.3 
  
360 
Botswana 6 7.5 61.9 38.1 3.8 n/a 19.9 30.8 
  
3,690 
Burkina Faso 4.3 10.6 45.9 54.1 5.8 0.9 n/a 98.9 
  
191 
Burundi 3 2 21.5 78.5 16.2 n/a n/a 100 
  
117 
Cameroon 4.6 7.9 26.2 73.8 6.4 0.1 n/a 93.7 
  
578 
Cape Verde 5 11.1 75.1 24.9 19.3 33.6 0.2 99.8 
  
1,408 
Central African Republic 3.9 7.4 41.6 58.4 17 n/a n/a 95.4 
  
249 
Chad 6.5 12.2 41.9 58.1 27.9 n/a 0.4 96.5 
  
186 
Congo 2.2 6 70.3 29.7 2.2 0 n/a 100 
  
963 
Côte d'Ivoire 6.2 7.2 22.4 77.6 2.2 23.5 5.4 94.6 
  
575 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 4.1 16.4 30.2 69.8 27.8 0 n/a 100 
  
103 
Djibouti 6.3 10.1 52.9 47.1 20.3 0 n/a 52.9 
  
825 
Equatorial Guinea 1.8 9.8 72.2 27.8 4.8 0 0 80.5 
  
2,652 
Eritrea 5.1 5.6 63.7 36.3 49.2 0 0 100 
  
171 
Ethiopia 5.7 7.6 44.9 55.1 29.5 0.5 0.4 65.9 
  
99 
Gabon 4.3 6.3 41.3 58.7 2.8 2.8 n/a 100 
  
4,097 
Gambia 7.3 12 44.6 55.4 40.6 0 n/a 64.3 
  
325 
Ghana 5.6 8.4 41 59 18.5 n/a 0 100 
  
212 
Guinea 5.8 4.8 15.5 84.5 9.5 1.4 0 99.5 
  
330 
Guinea-Bissau 6.3 8.5 48.2 51.8 35.9 0.1 0 100 191 
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Kenya 4.9 8.4 44 56 16.4 9.2 6.9 80 
  
336 
Lesotho 6.2 10.9 84.9 15.1 20.8 0 n/a 7 
  
375 
Madagascar 2.1 8 55 45 32.2 n/a 11.2 88.8 
  
252 
Malawi 9.8 9.7 41.1 58.9 37.6 0 1.7 42.6 
  
154 
Mali 4.5 9 50.8 49.2 18.2 27.7 0 88.8 
  
223 
Mauritania 3.9 10.1 74.2 25.8 3.3 0 0 100 
  
313 
Mauritius 2.9 8.3 76.9 23.1 1.8 7.2 0 100 
  
3,638 
Mozambique 5.8 19.9 71 29 39.3 0 0.6 36.5 
  
219 
Namibia 6.7 12.9 70.1 29.9 5.2 1.5 74.8 20.5 
  
1,516 
Niger 4 10 50.8 49.2 37.7 2.9 5.4 94.6 
  
172 
Nigeria 4.7 3.3 25.6 74.4 6.1 0 6.7 90.4 
  
317 
Rwanda 5.5 13.4 57.2 42.8 32.8 0.6 0.3 65.2 
  
218 
Senegal 5.1 11.2 45.2 54.8 16.9 14 3.5 96.5 
  
454 
Seychelles 5.2 6.6 74.3 25.7 7.5 5 0 60.4 
  
7,017 
Sierra Leone 2.9 6.8 60.3 39.7 16.5 0 0 100 
  
126 
Somalia 2.6 4.2 44.6 55.4 0 0 0 100   
South Africa 8.7 10.7 40.6 59.4 0.3 3.8 77.7 20.9 
  
2,860 
Sudan 4.9 6.3 20.7 79.3 2.6 0 0 99.5 
  
415 
Swaziland 6 10.9 59.5 40.5 3.5 0 20 41.7 
  
1,254 
Togo 10.5 7.8 10.8 89.2 4.7 14.4 2.3 93.4 
  
260 
Uganda 7.4 9.1 27.9 72.1 28.8 0 0.2 52.3 
  
284 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 4.9 14.9 54.8 45.2 26.9 2.7 4.4 82.5   
Zambia 5.8 11.3 52.9 47.1 18.6 0 0 75.3 
  
336 
Zimbabwe 8.5 12.2 51.6 48.4 2.5 0 38.8 47.3 
  
536 
Sources: WHO NHA database and IMF economic indicator database 
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APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE REACHED 
HIPC COMPLETION POINT 
 
A crude review of indicators in the health sector (Table C1) shows that immunisation 
levels, which are a good indicator of activity in primary health care, are either static 
as in the Ethiopian case, slightly decreasing as in the Ghanaian case, or are 
increasing as for Uganda and Mozambique.  
 
Table C1: Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source World Bank Development Indicators (2005) 
 
A more detailed analysis at country level is required and the following analyses of 
social spending uses country PRSP progress reports to analyse the extent to which 
social expenditure is increasing or planned to increase, and in which specific sectors. 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Social Spending in Ethiopia 
 
Table C2 shows the actual (2001/02) and estimated (2002/03) increase in poverty 
targeted spending in Ethiopia and also gives a break-down by social sector. Poverty 
targeted spending rose significantly as a percentage of GDP in 2001/02 but rose at a 
much lower rate in 2002/03. Health sector spending shows the same pattern, a 
dramatic increase over 2001/02 and a much less dramatic increase over 2002/03.  
 
Table C2: Increase in Poverty - Targeted Spending and HIPC Debt Relief since 
the Decision Point 
(In millions of US Dollars Unless otherwise Indicated) 
 
  
20001/02 
Act.  
2002/03 
Est. Total 
Increase in poverty-targeted spending 138 121 259 
(in percentage of GDP) 2.8 0.5 3.3 
(in percentage of total spending) 6.7 5.1 11.8 
Current poverty-targeted spending 44 67 111 
Agriculture and natural resources 5 6 11 
Roads  2 2 5 
Education 31 58 89 
Health 6 1 7 
Capital poverty targeted spending 94 54 148 
HIPC debt relief 50 62 112 
(in percent of GDP) 0.8 0.9 1.7 
( in percent of total spending) 2.4 2.6 5 
           Source: IMF (2004) Ethiopia – E-HIPC Completion Point Document pp7 
______________________________________________________________ 
HIPC 
Country  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Ethiopia 52 52 52 52 
Ghana 84 81 81 80 
Mozambique 71 74 77 77 
Uganda 61 63 77 82 
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________________________________________________________________ 
Social Spending in Ghana 
Poverty related expenditure in Ghana is showing a steady increase over the period 
projected period 2001-2004. Increases in basic education are significantly higher 
than increases in primary health care expenditure. Expenditure on health care is only 
growing at a marginal rate. 
 
 
Table C3: Ghana: Poverty Related Expenditure, 2001 – 2004 
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise Specified) 
 
 
  
2001      
Act.  
2002      
Est. 
2003  
Prov.     
2004 
Proj.  
Total poverty related expenditure 4.5 4.8 6.5 6.9
(As a percentage of total government 
expenditure) 13.9 18.3 22.3 24.5
     
Basic education 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.3
Primary health care 0.7 0.6 1 1.5
Agriculture-poverty focused 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Rural water 0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Feeder roads 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4
Rural electricity 0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Other poverty-related expenditure 0.6 0.7 1.2 1
HIPC Relief not yet allocated 0 0 0 0.1
     
Memorandum items:     
HIPC Relief 1/ … 1.2 1.4 2
Total government expenditure (billions of 
cedis) 12,451 12,753 19,157 22,307
Nominal GDP 38,071 48,862 66,158 78,650
Sources: Ghanaian authorities; and fund staff estimates and projections 
1/ Excluding 20 percent of relief that is allocated to domestic debt  reduction  
Source: IMF (2004) Ghana - E-HIPC Completion Point Document pp 10 
________________________________________________________________ 
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_____________________________________________________________ 
Social Spending In Mozambique 
 
Mozambique’s spending on health and education has been growing steadily over the 
period 1998-2000 (Table C4). Actual health spending has been growing at a 
significantly higher rate than education spending despite the budgeted figures.  
 
Table C4: Current Planned and Actual Expenditures in the Social Sectors 1998-
2000  
(In Units Indicated) 
 
 
 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
  
% of total spending 
budgeted 
% of total spending 
actual 
Education  16.1 18.9 23.3 18.1 20.6 23.6
Health 7.7 9.9 12.4 7.1 9.0 10.1
Total health and education 24.6 28.7 35.7 25.2 29.6 33.7
Memorandum items:       
Total current spending (Mt 
billions) 4.651 5.699 8.116 5.268 6.321 7.836
Total current spending (US$ 
mn) 392 449 535 445 498 516
Current health and 
Education (US$ mn) 96 129 191 112 147 174
Source: IMF (2001) Mozambique Completion Point Document for E-HIPC pp 10 
________________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________ 
Social Spending In Uganda 
 
Social spending in Uganda has also increased over the period 2000-2003, again with 
a greater focus on education expenditure than health expenditure. In absolute terms 
education is consistently approximately 4 times greater than health expenditure. 
 
Table C5: Sectoral Allocation of the Budget, FY 2000/01 – 2002/03 
 
  FY 2000/02 FY 2001/02 FY 2002/03 Growth 
Sector 
Shs 
Bn  
% of 
total 
Shs 
Bn  
% of 
total Shs Bn 
% of 
total % 
Security  209.8 13.9 229.2 12 261.7 12.9 24.7
Roads 138 9.2 170.2 8.9 150.5 7.4 9
Agriculture 24.1 1.6 49.1 2.6 46.8 2.3 93.9
Education 403.8 26.8 458.3 24.1 505.2 24.8 25.1
Health 114.2 7.6 170.1 8.9 196 9.6 71.6
Water 36.4 2.4 54 2.8 48.7 2.4 34
Law and 
order 94.5 6.3 128.5 6.8 142.2 7 50.5
Accountability 17.1 1.1 22.8 1.2 26.6 1.3 55.8
EF and SS 95.4 6.3 139.9 7.4 149.7 7.4 56.9
Public 
Administration 264.9 17.6 325.3 17.1 361.2 17.8 36.8
Interest 
Payments 107.1 7.1 155.1 8.2 144.6 7.1 35
Source: IMF (2003) Uganda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Annual Progress 
Report pp24                                     
EF = Economic Functions, SS = Social Services 
________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX D: Examples of community-based health insurance schemes 
 
Health insurance 
function 
Bwamanda 
DRC 
Nkoranza 
Ghana 
CAM 
Burundi 
Health Care Fund 
Tanzania (rural) 
Revenue collection • Voluntary 
• Community rated 
• Collected during crop selling 
(usually March) 
• Annual contribution 
• Voluntary 
• Community rated 
• Collected Dec-Jan 
• Annual contribution 
• Voluntary 
• Contributions set by central 
government 
• Per family rate (2 adults & all 
dependent children) 
• Annual contribution 
• Voluntary, except for local 
government civil servants 
• Flat rate premium per 
household (no limit) 
• Exemption mechanism for 
poor 
• Annual contribution 
Pooling and risk sharing • Families 
 
• Entire families 
• Doctor determines 
access to benefits 
 • Entire families 
 
Purchasing & provision • Linked to local hospital 
• All inpatient care and chronic 
care in health centre 
• 20% co-payment for hospital 
admission 
• Contract with NGO 
(mission) hospital 
• Covers admission/ 
inpatient care costs and 
reimburses costs of 
referral 
• Fee-for-service 
• Public health facilities only 
• All care at clinics & hospitals 
• Public health facilities 
• Out-patient services 
• Need to register with a 
specific facility and obtain 
care at that facility 
Ownership, 
management 
• Managed by district health 
team 
• Hospital based (mission) 
• No community 
involvement 
• Government initiated 
• Local government 
• Government initiated 
• District CHF board, 
community participation 
% population covered & 
membership numbers 
60-70% 
20,000 
23-27% 
23,000 
20-25% 
1.2 million 
5% in sampled districts 
Cost recovery 65-70% non-personnel 
recurrent 
55% of the cost of care for 
insured inpatients 
34% of outpatient drug costs  
Sources: (Jakab and Krishnan, 2004, Arhin-Tenkorang, 2004) 
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